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ABSTRACT 
Neandertal interpretation is changing the paradigm of human uniqueness, but exactly 
how needs to be examined. This paper provides a qualitative analysis of how Neandertal 
descriptions embed long-held cultural attitudes and how those cultural attitudes are being 
challenged and, in some ways, reaffirmed through rhetoric. A rhetorical analysis was performed 
on the second and third editions of a widely used physical anthropology textbook, Clark 
Spencer Larsen’s Our Origins. Both editions rhetorically favor a view of Neandertals as more 
similar to than different from us, a view which appears at odds with the disciplinary preference. 
Larsen appeals to the disciplinary preference in the second edition by only implicitly favoring 
similarities, but the third edition is more explicit in its favoring of similarities. The analysis of 
Larsen’s text provides examples of how rhetors can continue to move readers toward a new 
view of Neandertals, despite the current disciplinary preference for Neandertal classification.   
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INTRODUCTION 
Since their discovery in the nineteenth century, debates on how to classify Neandertal 
remains have proliferated. Some scholars argue that Neandertals should be classified within our 
own species (as a sub-species, Homo sapiens neanderthalensis) while others argue that they 
should be classified as a separate and distinct species (as Homo neanderthalensis). Other 
species’ classifications are also debated, but those debates do not as directly confront the 
boundary between “human” and “non-human,” a boundary that has been shifting for well over 
200 years. While in recent years the general preference has been to classify Neandertals as a 
species distinct and separate from ourselves (De Vos, 2009, p. 376), recent studies on the 
Neandertal genome, which show interbreeding between anatomically modern humans (AMHs) 
and Neandertals, have re-opened the debate (White, Gowlett, & Grove, 2014, p. 32).  
Debates about how to categorize species have sometimes been underemphasized and 
disregarded as arbitrary. Louis Leakey (1963), for example, dismissed disagreements about 
classification by writing, “it does not, I believe, matter what we decide to do, provided only that 
the majority of those who are concerned in the classification, at any given time, are agreed as to 
how they will use the classification system that is set up and provided that they are clear as to 
what they mean by the different names that are applied” (qtd. in Marks, 2007, p. 7).  Charles 
Darwin (1859) also commented on the arbitrary nature of species delimitation: “I was much 
struck how entirely vague and arbitrary is the distinction between species and varieties.” 
Indeed, species classification is arbitrary in the sense that human classification does not alter 
the natural world. 
Some take the arbitrary nature of definitions one step further, questioning if the idea of 
a “species” is even objectively real. David Stamos (2003) asked, “Are species words merely 
operational conveniences made for the purpose of conveying various information and theories, 
or do species words refer to entities in the objective world with a real existence independent of 
science?” (p. 1). In other words, are we imposing on the world linguistic categories that do not 
objectively exist with such clean delineations, or have we “discovered” the linguistics categories 
“out there” and simply named them? This question, although recognizing the basic convenience 
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and immediate purpose of language (exchange of ideas), ignores the social reality of language. 
Definitions are not necessarily “based on the self-evidence of conceptual relations” (Perelman & 
Olbrechts-Tyteca, 1969, p. 210), but they are always socially constructed. Classification of 
Neandertals as human or as separate from human changes the way we view the remains and 
can be said to have a social effect.  
When an argument is made to define a particular individual as belonging to one species 
and not another, the rhetor is attempting to shape views on species in a general sense. People 
who “argue in favor of some definition want it, through some slant or other, to influence the 
use which would probably have been made of the concept had they not intervened and mostly 
to influence the relations of the concept with the whole system of thought” (Perelman & 
Olbrechts-Tyteca, 1969, p. 213). One of the most striking examples of how species 
classifications can affect our reality, and how our reality affects species classifications, comes 
before Darwin’s publication of Origin, when some people argued that the different human races 
constituted different species. The subjectively declared “inferiority” of black culture was used 
as “evidence” of the race’s distinctness as a species. Such classification was used as a way to 
justify the institution of slavery (Gould, 1996, pp. 71–72), an institution with very obvious social 
consequences.  
Although supposed inferiority and superiority are no longer used as criteria for 
classifying species, there still is necessarily some subjective criteria in classification (White et 
al., 2014, p. 34). Classification based on morphology is an older method and more likely to 
place Neandertals in a species group distinct from anatomically modern humans (AMHs). 
However, deciding whether two individuals are morphologically similar enough to be the same 
species is necessarily a subjective judgment. In contrast, cladistics analysis, a relatively new 
method for classifying based on genetic similarity and evolutionary relationships, is 
theoretically unambiguous because actual patterns of descent determine each organism’s 
position in the scheme. Understanding the evolutionary relations of a group clearly determines 
how the organisms in the group should be classified (Boyd & Silk, 2009, p. 111). Most 
taxonomists agree that cladistics is a useful method and that descent should be considered 
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when defining a species, but taxonomists “vehemently disagree about whether descent should 
be the only factor used to classify organisms” (Boyd & Silk, 2009, p. 110). Although 
classification based on cladistics may appear at first glance to be less subjective than 
classification based on morphology, the validity of genetic criteria is often debated (White et al., 
2014, p. 34) and uncertainty in knowledge of genetic relationships renders cladistics quite 
ambiguous in some regards. For example, most indicators of genetic closeness indicate that 
chimpanzees are more closely related to humans than they are to gorillas, but some genetic 
tests indicate the opposite.  Morphologically, taxonomists view chimps as more similar to 
gorillas than to humans (Boyd & Silk, 2009, p. 112). How, then, should chimps be classified?   
The answer may depend on the purpose for the classification.  Cladistics reflects “the 
process of evolutionary history” whereas traditional taxonomy reflects the “outcome of 
evolutionary history” (Wood, 2010, p. 8902). Choosing one method over another thus changes 
the terministic screen through which evolution is viewed.  There is no one objective measure to 
prefer one method of classification to another.  The naming becomes cultural and dependent 
on what is given more importance. Choosing one method of classification over another thus 
reveals a cultural attitude toward a subject (valuing products more than processes, for 
example). When scholars argue that one method of classification is preferable, they are 
attempting to persuade the reader to value one classification system over another.  
Persuading an audience to have a certain value system sometimes involves drastically 
restructuring the reader’s worldview.  A careful rhetor knows that such restructuring is not 
easy. In The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, Thomas Kuhn (1996) described the moments in 
science in which paradigm shifts occur.  Normal science advances a knowledge base, but 
revolutionary science changes established paradigms. Charles Darwin’s On the Origin of Species 
has been identified again and again as the catalyst for such a scientific revolution (Berra, 2008, 
p. 1).  However, as John Angus Campbell (2003) recognized, no idea can be intelligible unless 
the interlocutors share a “context of assumptions” (p. 203). The context of assumptions 
constitutes a perceptual frame, which must always be considered in tandem with the current 
consensus when advancing an argument. If a scientific finding appears to contradict the 
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established body of knowledge, one must still, somehow, align the finding with something that 
is accepted.  Ziman (1968) described the paradoxical nature of a scientific revolution—to 
change the consensus, first, the rhetor must demonstrate understanding and acceptance of the 
consensus (p. 64).  Aligning one’s views with the audience’s views is a basic requirement of 
argumentation: a person will be persuaded only insofar as the rhetor “can talk his [or her] 
language by speech, gesture, tonality, order, image, attitude, idea, identifying” (Burke, 1950, p. 
55) with the audience.  
Although “the revolutionary” is perhaps the most well-known representation of Darwin, 
Darwin did use language as a way to align his ideas with his audience’s already-established 
views. In Origin, he drew heavily on language from natural theology (Campbell, 2003, p. 221; 
Moore, 1997, p. 112), which was popular at the time Darwin was writing.  Other science writers 
draw on popular notions and ideas all the time—without doing so, revolutionary ideas would 
not be accepted.   
The notion of Neandertals as being the same species as us is still revolutionary. The 
present study does not attempt to weigh in on the debate of whether Neandertals are H. sapiens 
or not. (Such an argument is better left to the scholars who study Neandertal remains and 
evolution.) Rather, I take a closer look at what attitudes are being conveyed about Neandertals 
and what degree of humanness they are granted. Specifically, this paper asks how modern 
humans and Neandertals are rhetorically associated and disassociated from one another, and 
how that association/dissociation is shifting or has shifted. Julia Drell’s (2000) paper is similar 
to my own in that it explored the ways Neandertals have been conceptualized as Same or Other, 
but her study explored the changing historical views of Neandertals within paleoanthropology, 
visual representation, and literary fiction. The present paper differs in that it focuses on one 
text as a way to flush out more of the qualitative and interacting attitudes toward Neandertals. 
However, because I look at two editions of the same text, this study still shows how our views 
of Neandertals are evolving. This study adds to Drell’s in that it will not just determine what 
ideas are being conveyed about Neandertals, but also how those ideas are negotiated in a 
scientific context of debate and uncertainty. In sum, this study creates a more complex picture 
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of how Neandertals are depicted as Same or Other by demonstrating how one popular writer in 
anthropology balances the “old” view of human uniqueness and a “new” revolutionary view that 
connects us more to Neandertals. Darwin certainly upset the common notion of human 
uniqueness with the publication of Origin, but the narrative of human uniqueness was not 
destroyed overnight.  
In what follows, I first outline the history of modern human and Neandertal 
classifications and interpretations and the relevant rhetorical theory in order to place my own 
findings within a larger context. Next, I describe my method for exploring the ways in which 
Neandertals are rhetorically connected to or disconnected from anatomically modern humans. I 
then present my findings along with my analysis and discussion of those findings. My analysis, 
while contextualized by a historical understanding of how Neandertals have been classified, is 
largely based on the current debates and cultural views of Neandertals along with rhetorical 
theory.  Finally, I articulate how the rhetorical landscape of Neandertals description has 
changed and how writers can use rhetorical methods to continue that change. I also explore 
how the rhetoric foreshadows a relatively new move toward heightened connection between 
Neandertals and anatomically modern humans.  
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HISTORY OF MODERN HUMAN AND NEANDERTAL CLASSIFICATIONS  
Carl Linnaeus laid the groundwork for species classification with the publication of 
Systema Natura in 1737.  Linnaeus’s method, referred to as binomial nomenclature or 
traditional taxonomy, is still in use today and is based on observed morphological traits.  
Linnaeus classified individuals able to produce viable offspring with one another as belonging 
to the same species; species were then grouped in genera, and so on.  Linnaeus’s taxonomy was 
the first logical system to classify the world’s living organisms.  Because natural history was 
popular in the eighteenth century, Linnaeus’s classification system was easily accepted 
(Trinkaus & Shipman, 1992, pp. 10–11).  However, there was at least one aspect of the 
taxonomic system that was controversial:  the placement of humans within the system under 
the order Primates.  This move was controversial because it went against the contemporary 
thought that humans “should be considered unique and separate from the rest of the animal 
kingdom” (Jurmain, Kilgore, & Trevathan, 2011, p. 31). Thus, many people rejected the 
classification. Georges Cuvier and Johann Blumenbach1, for example, granted humans a higher 
degree of separateness from the rest of the animals by placing them in their own order, citing 
upright posture and mental capacities as defining traits (Boyd & Silk, 2009, p. 117). In the mid-
1800s, Darwin argued against this common way to view humans by citing Huxley, who claimed 
there is “no justification for placing man in a distinct order” (qtd. in Darwin, 1871, p. 116). 
Humans have since been classified in the order Primates.  
In addition to shifts in their order, Homo sapiens have seen shifts in their taxonomic 
family. Into the 1980’s, the term “hominid” referred only to species within the human 
evolutionary lineage. As a way to more accurately represent Homo sapiens’s close genetic 
relationship with the other great apes, a new classification system places humans and all of the 
African apes within the family “hominid.” The family is divided into the sub-families pan, 
gorilla, and hominin, with hominin now referencing the specific species within the human 
evolutionary lineage. This shift in our taxonomic categorization has caused confusion with the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1 Cuvier and Blumenbach also viewed Caucasians to be a species separate from other races.    
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terms being used incorrectly or interchangeably, but there is a general move to accept the new 
terms and educate the public about their uses.  In 2001, for instance, National Geographic 
printed a story using the new term “hominin” and “subsequently received several hundred e-
mails complaining about the poor editorial work of the staff that had clearly erred by replacing 
a ‘d’ with an ‘n’” (Berger, 2001). National Geographic defended the decision, claiming the term 
“hominin” was “technically more correct” and that “in the long run, hominin is likely to win out 
against the term hominid. It is more precise and recognizes the biological reality that moves 
beyond physical morphology” (Berger, 2001).  Likewise, in 2006, Simon Underdown (2006) wrote 
to the prestigious publication Nature to advocate for the new terms.  
Although H. sapiens now share the same order and family with other species, they are 
still the only surviving member of the genus Homo. Many scholars comfortably claim that AMHs 
are qualitatively different and unique from other living species.  Of course, every species is 
unique from other species, but human uniqueness is defined as being more unique than other 
types of between-species uniqueness.  In the textbook Introduction to Physical Anthropology, for 
example, Jurmain, Kilgore, and Trevathan (2011) are almost defensive in their clarification of 
human uniqueness.  Under the heading “The Human Connection,” the authors describe how 
humans are genetically, anatomically, and behaviorally connected to other living species, but 
the section ends by describing the limitations of the connection:  “However,” the authors write, 
“human beings are unquestionably unique regarding one highly significant characteristic, and 
that is intellect” (Jurmain et al., 2011, p. 6).  The section is followed by one on biocultural 
evolution, which is also used to define humans as unique. 
Culture and behavior may be used to define humans as qualitatively different than other 
living species, but human uniqueness becomes more difficult to defend when comparing 
modern humans with extinct species (Moritz, 2012), such as Neandertals. The disagreement on 
how to classify Neandertals is partly due to differences in defining a species. At least 24 
different species concepts currently exist (Neubauer, 2014), and the great number is partly 
because different disciplines have different aims and study different topics; the species concept 
used to study bacteria may not be the most useful lens to use when studying human remains. 
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The most widely accepted way to view Neandertals is as a distinct species—this lens tends to 
stress the morphological differences between AMHs and Neandertals. This view aligns with the 
most accepted way to view humanity’s origins: through the Out-of-Africa model (Villa & 
Roebroeks, 2014, p. 1),  which hypothesizes that anatomically modern humans originated in 
Africa before spreading to Asia and Europe. The other competing lens for viewing Neandertals 
focuses more on the genetic relationships between AMHs and Neandertals, considers 
Neandertals to be Homo sapiens, and aligns with the Multiregional Continuity model for 
humanity’s origins, which hypothesizes that anatomically modern humans evolved regionally.  
 
Terministic Screens 
The Out-of-Africa and the Multiregional Continuity models, and their corresponding 
classifications of Neandertals, are different terministic screens. “Terministic screen” is a term 
that Burke (1966) uses to describe the way language affects “the nature of our observations, in 
the sense that the terms direct the attention to one field rather than to another” (Burke, 1966, 
p. 46). Norwood Hanson describes how the same evidence—in this instance, Neanderthal 
remains— can lead to different views. A person who argues for Neanderthals as a sub-species of 
Home sapiens would share a “common visual experience” (Hanson, 1958, p. 7) with a person 
who argues for Neanderthals to be classified as a separate species, meaning the two people 
would share the same retinal reaction to the remains.  Because observation is theory-laden, 
however, the two people could still see the remains differently.  Hanson would not argue that 
the two people first see and then lay interpretations on top of what is seen.  The interpretation 
is embedded within the observation, and so two people can look at the same phenomena and 
see, not just interpret, differently.   
What is seen within an observation is dependent upon a person’s “corpus of . . . 
knowledge” (Hanson, 1958, p. 20).  For example, an observer may see a bird and simultaneously 
“see that it will not suddenly do vertical snap rolls” (Hanson, 1958, p. 21).  “Seeing that” is how 
prior knowledge affects what one sees. People used to “see that” humans were unique and 
separate from other species, which was what led to humanity’s classification in a separate 
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order. It was not until Darwin, with all of his prior knowledge from studying nature, that people 
could “see that” Homo sapiens should be classified in the order Primates.  Likewise, it was not 
until we started studying genetic relationships that anybody “saw that” humans should share 
the same family as other species. Although genetic evidence may have overturned the notion 
that humanity exists in a unique and separate family, genetic evidence has not been able to 
overturn the notion that we exist as a unique and separate species. The lens of “seeing that” 
anatomically modern humans are unique, and that Neandertals are “different” or “other,” has a 
long history.  
 
Historical Interpretations of Neandertals 
The first Homo neanderthalensis remains were discovered in 1829 and were initially 
interpreted as Homo sapiens, the clear anatomical differences being dismissed as aberrations—
the remains did not belong to a normal human.  The same interpretation was applied the 
second time Neandertal remains were discovered in 1848 (Dunsworth, 2007, p. 8).  The 1848 
discovery was so inconsequential that the only mention of it at the time was in the minutes for 
the Gibraltar Scientific Society; the secretary was said to have “presented a human skull from 
Forbes’ Quarry, North Front” (qtd. in Trinkaus & Shipman, 1992, p. 45). In 1856, men working 
on a quarry in Neander Valley, Germany, discovered more remains, which were eventually 
passed to the hands of John Fuhlrott. Fuhlrott sought out Hermann Schaaffhausen, the 
professor of anatomy at a nearby university, to help interpret the remains.  The two were the 
first to classify Neandertal remains as belonging to a non-human, non-aberrant species. 
The nineteenth-century scientific community did not accept Fuhlortt and 
Schaaffhausen’s interpretations of the remains. The distinguished pathologist Rudolf Virchow 
greatly influenced the scientific rejection of Neandertal as an archaic human (Trinkaus & 
Shipman, 1992), and Virchow’s influence was possible partly because his views coalesced with 
the popular convictions of the time (Drell, 2000, p. 2). For the people in the nineteenth century 
to accept Neandertals as a distinct species, they would have had to accept that the human 
lineage was malleable and that non-human hominin species existed so recently (“Anthropology 
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talk: Dr. Dean Falk, on fossil ‘hobbits’" [Abstract], 2013).  Thus, the remains were regarded as 
pathological because species were considered immutable and “in that they were unlike modern 
humans: they represented a deviation from humanness” (Trinkaus & Shipman, 1992, p. 59). The 
idea of species mutability was gaining traction at the time of the Neander Valley discovery in 
1856, but resistance to the idea was widespread.  
Three years after the discovery in Neander Valley, Charles Darwin published his highly 
influential On the Origin of Species, which opened many possibilities for interpreting the 
Neander Valley remains. In 1863, Darwin’s “bulldog” Thomas Huxley classified the remains as 
belonging to a sub-species of human (White et al., 2014, p. 32), but Huxley’s classification was 
not commonly accepted. After Origin, the most widely held view came to be that the Neandertal 
remains represented a “missing link” between African apes and AMHs, but not a link to a direct 
ancestor. Rather, the Neandertals were mostly viewed as an evolutionary offshoot, a dead-end 
of a different species (Howell, 1957, pp. 330–331). Ernst Haeckel suggested naming the remains 
Homo stupidus, but William King’s earlier naming and classification of the remains as Homo 
Neanderthalensis2 is what stuck (Wolpoff & Caspari, 2007, p. 271). By 1864, the idea that the 
Neander Valley remains belonged to a non-human, non-aberrant species called Homo 
Neanderthalensis was established (Dunsworth, 2007, p. 8). 
In the years to come, the designation Homo Neanderthalensis was applied to many other 
remains that we consider distinct from Neandertals today. For example, the Rhodesian fossils, 
which are now commonly classified as either Homo rhodesiensis or Homo heidelbergensis, were 
originally grouped with Neandertals. Around the time of World War II, however, researchers 
were starting more often to consider fossils within the environmental and climatic contexts in 
which they were found, partly due to an increasing number of fossil discoveries. The 1960s 
were especially favorable for excavations (Condemi, 2011, p. 12).  
In addition to their classification as a distinct species, Neandertals were marked as 
different from humans in their behavior. However, Solecki, in the 1971 publication of Shanidar, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 King (1864) would later change his mind and view the Neandertal remains as so different from 
AMH as to justify classification in a different genus, not just species.  
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The First Flower People, described a likely Neanderthal burial site, a description which helped 
usher in a scientific shift in how to view Neanderthals. Around this time, “focus of Neanderthal 
studies shifted from the behavioral pre-Sapiens to the anatomical pre-Sapiens” (Drell, 2000, p. 
16). In other words, Neandertals became much more scientifically Same, but only in terms of 
behavior, not morphology. Also in the 1970s and the early 1980s, scholars began placing 
Neandertal studies “in a broader population framework” by analyzing “variation among modern 
human populations” (Condemi, 2011, p. 12). These changes in the 1970s coincided with the 
classification of Neandertals as a sub-species of humans, Homo sapiens neanderthalensis.  That 
is not to say that the classification was necessarily agreed upon as a consensus, but the view of 
Neandertals in the 1970s did take on a more connective quality.  
 
DNA Studies 
In the 1980’s, many researchers continued to believe that Neandertals had directly 
evolved into AMHs (Villa & Roebroeks, 2014, p. 1). However, since most of the studies were 
based on morphology, disagreement was (and is) common. Morphological studies led some 
researchers to claim that Neandertals contributed some of their genes to AMH populations, 
other scholars to argue that Neandertals were the direct ancestors of Europeans, and other 
scholars to argue that Neandertals were an evolutionary off-shoot that did not contribute any 
genes to AMH (Green et al., 2010, p. 710). This last argument, which originally gained popularity 
in 1864 after Darwin published Origin, gained further support through studies conducted in the 
late 80’s and early-to-mid 90’s which analyzed not Neandertal morphology, but DNA sequences 
from present-day humans (Krings et al., 1997, p. 19). By the late 1980s, Neandertals were again 
classified as a distinct species and the “name Homo neanderthalensis was reintroduced” 
(Condemi, 2011, pp. 12–13).  
However, the studies that analyzed human DNA as a method to investigate gene flow 
between AMH and Neandertals had their validity questioned and were criticized for relying on 
assumptions, such the omission of selection (Krings et al., 1997, p. 19). As a response to this 
criticism, in 1997, Krings et al. published the first study to analyze directly DNA sequences 
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from Neandertal remains. Krings et al.’s study used 370 base pairs (bp) of the DNA inherited 
only via the mother, mitochondrial DNA (mtDNA). Today, 370 bp and mtDNA in general are 
acknowledged as very small parts of the hominid genome but nevertheless “represented a 
major breakthrough in ancient DNA research” (Hofreiter, 2011, p. 1). The conclusions drawn by 
Kring et al. (1997) supported the notion that Neandertals contributed no genes to AMHs, but 
subsequent studies using mtDNA led other researchers to conclude that Neandertals 
contributed up to as much as 25% to the modern human gene pool. As the years progressed, the 
main problem with using mtDNA analysis as a method to investigate Neandertal and modern 
human relations became more apparent: in addition to being inherited only through the female 
lineage, mtDNA “represents a mere 0.0005% of a complete hominid genome” (Hofreiter, 2011, p. 
2).  
DNA sequencing technology has since progressed from sequencing mtDNA to 
sequencing the nuclear genome. While mtDNA comprises 16,569 nucleotides of DNA (the 
“building blocks” of DNA), the nuclear genome comprises about 3.2 billion nucleotides of DNA 
(Brown, 2002, p. 4). Additionally, while mtDNA can only be traced through the mother’s lineage, 
nuclear DNA is inherited and can thus be traced through both the mother’s and father’s 
lineages. Thus, studies on the nuclear genome provide a clearer picture of Neandertals’ 
relationship to AMHs (Green et al., 2010, p. 710). The first Neandertal nuclear DNA sequences 
were reported in 2006 by two separate teams, one led by Svante Pääbo (Green et al., 2006) and 
the other led by Edward Rubin (Noonan et al., 2006).  Although the research teams were 
studying the same Neandertal extract, they came to differing conclusions: Rubin’s team 
reported no evidence for gene flow between Neandertals and modern humans, and Pääbo’s 
team found evidence for substantial gene flow. The two studies also differed in methodology, 
with Pääbo able to obtain a larger amount of DNA sequence data than Rubin: about 1 million bp 
of Neandertal DNA sequence compared to 60,000 bp, respectively (Hofreiter, 2011, p. 2). 
Although Pääbo’s team’s methodology was viewed as better for obtaining the Neandertal 
genome, their data was unreliable. Four years after their 2006 study, they conceded that 
between 11 and 40% of their data sets had been contaminated with modern human DNA (Green 
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et al., 2010, p. 711). In a 2010 study, Svante Pääbo’s team improved their methodology to 
significantly reduce the DNA contamination and have since argued convincingly that some 
degree of interbreeding occurred between AMHs and Neandertals 
 
Current Views of Neandertals 
It is now generally accepted that Neandertals and AMHs interbred, but such acceptance 
has not led to a consensus regarding how to classify Neandertals. In a larger context, it must be 
acknowledged that some other species interbreed but are still considered distinct from one 
another by a majority of the scientific community, so interbreeding does not have the 
persuasive power to overcome other speculations about the genome that please what Hofreiter 
calls “human vanity” (p. 8). Hofreiter concludes, “in the end it remains a philosophical question 
whether the two human forms are assigned to the same or different species or subspecies, 
which is, moreover, largely irrelevant for understanding the process of human evolution” (pp. 7-
8).  
Hofreiter’s attitude is reminiscent of Leakey’s (1963) concerning the arbitrary nature of 
species classification, which not only ignores the social reality of definitions, but also ignores 
the effects of those definitions. For example, Villa and Roebroeks (2014) point out that the 
disappearance of Neandertals is “routinely explained in terms of the ‘superiority’ of modern 
humans” based on archeological evidence. However, after reviewing the current archaeological 
evidence, Villa and Roebroeks write that they found “no data in support of the supposed 
technological, social and cognitive inferiority of Neandertals compared to their AMH 
contemporaries” (7). The researchers conclude that the demise of Neandertals was more 
complex than just declaring them cognitively inferior and that “archaeologists’ 
characterizations of Neandertals as cognitively inferior to modern humans have created an 
interpretive framework within which subtle biological differences between Neandertals and 
modern humans tend to be overinterpreted” (Villa & Roebroeks, 2014, p. 7). The old worldview, 
Villa and Roebrokes warn, is causing researchers to “see that” humans are unique and superior, 
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which might cause an unwarranted exaggeration concerning the differences between AMHs and 
Neandertals.  
Researchers who study Neandertal remains surely “see” as researchers in a unique way 
that is influenced by their discipline, but they are influenced by culture, just as anybody else is. 
In our culture’s common parlance, the word “Neandertal” is derogatory—it is an insult used to a 
degrade a person’s intelligence or manners. For example, a news article published on May 10, 
2014 (on the online version of The Philadelphia Inquirer), although stressing the similarities 
between Neanderthals and humans, still appealed to popular ideas concerning Neanderthals by 
beginning with an apology: “No offense, but your ancestors probably were no brighter than a 
Neanderthal” (Dunham, 2014). This cultural insult—to call someone a “Neandertal”—may be 
activated in a reader’s mind even when reading about scientific understandings of Neandertals. 
Research by Patrizia Tabossi (1988) has found that uttering a word can activate associations a 
person has with that word.  Even if somebody is discussing “Neandertal” to mean “a member of 
the genus Homo,” the meaning “idiot” may be activated.  Tabossi tells us, “Context intervenes in 
selecting the appropriate interpretations of the lexical item only subsequently” (p. 324).   
Tabossi also notes that a word’s dominant meaning does not prevent or undermine the 
activation of its other possible meanings (p. 325). 
Additionally, researchers, even if not personally agreeing with the worldview of the 
general populace, must appeal to that worldview when writing to more generalized audiences. 
Thus, any writing about Neandertals intended for non-specialized audiences is expected to 
appeal to common ideas about Neandertals at the same time it negotiates a more nuanced 
identification with Neandertals rather than purely “Other” or different.  Even before the first 
nuclear genome studies, Julia Drell (2000) noted a tendency for researchers to represent 
Neandertals as “same but other” (20). It remains to be seen exactly how Neandertals are 
associated and dissociated form anatomically modern humans. Looking closer at the language 
used to define and describe Neandertals provides a qualitative picture of the ways Neandertals 
are revolutionizing and preserving the common worldview of humans as unique.   
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RHETORICAL ANALYSIS AS METHOD FOR ANALYSIS 
In order to explore how Neandertals are used to define humanness and how the view of 
Neandertals is changing, I examined the language of Neandertal description and definition in 
the second and third editions of the textbook Our Origins by Clark Spencer Larsen. My two 
main questions were centered on identification:   
• How are humans and Neandertals rhetorically associated/connected and 
disassociated/disconnected from one another?   
• How has the popular cultural attitude of human uniqueness been preserved or 
undermined within the rhetoric used to describe and define Neandertals?  
The cultural valuation of human uniqueness was expected to appear in the language to 
describe Neandertals because some interpretations of Neandertals can be read as direct threats 
to modern humanity’s separateness from nature.  In addition, assumptions about human 
uniqueness are what led to the historical interpretations of Neandertals as aberrant archaic 
humans, so modern interpretations and representations of Neandertals may show traces of this 
same cultural valuation. However, language was also expected to appear that attempts to 
restructure the reader’s thought processes in subtle ways. 
 
Physical Anthropology as a Site of Heightened Human Uniqueness 
While it can be useful to compare how different fields define Neandertals (or other 
species), differences in species concepts between fields are likely due to their differing 
purposes of classification.  I look specifically at physical anthropology’s language and 
definitions because physical anthropology is explicitly concerned with what it means to be 
human. Thus, the field uses Neandertal remains for the purpose of understanding modern 
humans and will yield insights into how the rhetoric surrounding Neandertals is used to 
separate or connect Us and Them.  Admittedly, physical anthropology seems to devalue 
Neandertals from the outset: “if a fact is appraised in terms of its consequences, one seems to 
be regarding it as a means to these consequences and, by that very fact, to be devaluing it” 
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(Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca, 1969, p. 433). Because the interest in Neanderthals is generally 
connected to an interest in understanding modern humans, Neanderthals are subsumed under 
us. Physical anthropology, therefore, may be more aligned than other disciplines with cultural 
conceptions of humans as unique.  Thus, any departure from the consensus may be regarded as 
modest when compared with other disciplines. 
 
Teaching Tacit Knowledge, Changing Cultural Consensus: Justification for Analyzing a 
Textbook 
 In order to analyze how the narrative of human uniqueness is reinforced or undermined 
within physical anthropology, a widely used textbook was chosen for analysis. Although 
textbooks are not meant for the general public, they are still consumed by a diverse audience 
and are thus powerful rhetorical tools for transmitting ideas to a large number of people. 
Textbooks contain the explicitly accepted knowledge of a field, and they may also contain 
traces of what Polanyi (1958) calls tacit knowledge.  Tacit knowledge is personal knowledge that 
one cannot always explain or even concentrate on.  It is generally informally taught from master 
to apprentice.  In physical anthropology, we might consider attitudes about evolution as a form 
of tacit knowledge.  It is often attitudes that cause someone to study evolution in the first 
place.   Michael Ruse (1996) explicitly studied attitudes of evolutionary scientists by analyzing 
writings of and conversations with the top evolutionary scientists from the last 20 years.  He 
found that they all, “almost without exception” (Lessl, 2012, p. 13), mix evolutionary theory 
with evolutionism, a term Ruse uses “to describe any nonscientific application of the ideas of 
evolutionary science” (Lessl, 2012, p. 13). Ruse thinks the tendency to mix evolutionary theory 
and evolutionism might help explain why evolutionary scientists had trouble gaining respect in 
the past, but he ultimately presents the tendency as a matter of personal preference that, in the 
grand scheme, is not very significant (Ruse, 1996, pp. 526–39).  
Ruse (1996) presents the tacit knowledge of evolutionary scientists as unimportant since 
peer review helps to filter out subjective attitudes, but Thomas Lessl (2012) thinks such a 
dismissal is a mistake on Ruse’s part.  Popular scientific publications, Lessl claims, have a great 
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rhetorical force and do not separate theory from the sentiments about the theory.  Popular 
textbooks therefore mix explicit, accepted knowledge with tacit knowledge.   
While popular scientific publications are sure to reveal the tacit knowledge and attitudes 
physical anthropologists exhibit about Neandertals, studying textbooks as opposed to a text 
meant for a wider audience can expose the more subtle ways that language operates to encode 
attitudes.  Although most physical anthropologists are sure to be aware of their own attitudes 
regarding Neandertals, some of the language choices may not even be conscious.  All language, 
no matter for whom it is written, may have some remnants of the author’s subjective and 
cultural worldview.  Scientific writing is often presented as objective, but it is impossible to 
have a pure language void of cultural valuations; “we must use terministic screens, since we 
can’t say anything without the use of terms; whatever the terms we use, they necessarily 
constitute a corresponding kind of screen; and any such screen necessarily directs the attention 
to one field rather than another” (Burke, 1966, p. 50). Any cultural valuations that come across 
in a physical anthropologist’s writings about Neandertals may function as a subtle way to teach 
the student the tacit knowledge about Neandertals.  Learning the explicit knowledge concerning 
Neandertals is very important, but entering into and mastering a discipline also involves 
learning implicit lessons, such as the common attitude in the field toward a particular subject.  
This tacit knowledge is part of the “corpus of [physical anthropologists’] knowledge” (Hanson, 
1958, p. 20) that affects how they see Neandertal remains.  
Because physical anthropologists share prior knowledge, they will “see that” 
interpretations of Neandertal remains carry certain meanings. There will, of course, still be 
differences in what is seen, but the differences will not be as drastic as what somebody from 
outside the discipline sees because the organization of seeing for two physical anthropologists 
will be more similar than the organization of seeing for a specialist and non-specialist.  
Therefore, the rhetor has less reason to persuade other like-minded scientists to “see” in a 
certain way—the seeing is taken, to a certain extent, as a given.  What is agreed upon that is 
seen will be the consensus in the scientific community. Texts written for non-specialized 
audiences will contain more rhetorical moves that attempt to change the entire “organization of 
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what one sees” (Hanson, 1958, p. 12) since non-specialized audiences must be convinced, first, 
to accept the consensus within physical anthropology. The student using a physical 
anthropology textbook may be thought of as an apprentice and the established writer the 
master; by emulating the master, “the apprentice unconsciously picks up the rules of the art, 
including those which are not explicitly known to the master him [or her]self” (Polanyi, 1958, p. 
53).   Because rhetoric can subtly influence the student’s attitude toward the subject, it works 
as a mode of action, not just a way to communicate information (Burke, 1966, p. 54). 
 
Larsen’s Our Origins 
The specific physical anthropology text used for analysis is Our Origins by Clark 
Spencer Larsen. It was chosen based on Amazon’s list of bestsellers in physical anthropology.  
A text by one author admittedly limits the generalizations that are possible from this study, but 
limiting the study was necessary in order to allow a thorough qualitative analysis of how 
Neandertals are understood, discussed, and defined. However, the specific textbook chosen 
uses rhetorical moves that are common in the discipline—thus the analysis does offer some 
generalizations about the rhetoric of physical anthropology. For example, even the name 
“Neandertal” has a rhetorical effect, and use of the name is certainty not limited to one text.  
Additionally, because the text was chosen for analysis based on the bestsellers from 
Amazon, America’s top bookseller (Habash, 2013), it can be concluded that the text is accepted 
within the discipline. Amazon creates its bestseller lists based on sales, and the lists are 
updated hourly. During the first two weeks of January 2014, again in late December of 2014, 
and on three separate days in January 2015 (the 7th, the 16th, and the 21st), I tracked the 
bestsellers on the Amazon physical anthropology list. Because most American university 
students would have been in between semesters during the timeframes I was checking the list, 
it is likely that many students would have been buying college textbooks from Amazon during 
this timeframe. For all of the dates checked, the textbook chosen, Our Origins: Discovering 
Physical Anthropology by Clark Spencer Larsen, was in the top ten bestsellers.  
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In order to provide insight into how the discipline has changed and is still changing, two 
different editions of the text were analyzed: the second and the third editions. Both editions of 
the text spent time on Amazon’s list of bestsellers, a testament to this particular text’s 
popularity. On December 28, 2014, the third edition of the text was number one on the 
bestsellers list. On January 7, January 16, and January 21 of 2015, the third edition of the text 
was still number one on the physical anthropology bestseller list. On the same three dates in 
January of 2015, the second edition of the book, which Amazon listed as published February 
16, 2012, appeared on the bestseller list at number two. Another version of the second edition, 
which Amazon listed as published December 15, 2010 (and with a different cover than the 
other second edition), appeared at number seven on the list on all three of the January 2015 
dates. The reason different editions and versions of the same text appeared on Amazon’s 
bestseller list may be because some instructors were using an old edition or version of the text 
and it may also be because some students were buying older editions in order to save money. 
For example, on January 7, 2015, Amazon listed the third edition’s price for used copies 
starting at $106, while the 2010 version of the second edition’s price for used copies started at 
$8.09.  
In sum, the physical anthropology text written by Clark Spencer Larsen is widely used in 
multiple editions and multiple copies. This particular analysis used the second edition (a 
version published in 2011) for the main analysis—unless stated otherwise, all reported page 
numbers and uses of the singular “text” are for this edition and version of the text. When 
analyzing an element from the third edition (published in 2014), page numbers are specified as 
specifically for the third edition in citations. However, it should be noted that the second and 
third editions do not significantly differ—the specific differences are discussed in the results 
and discussion section of this paper.  
 
Rhetorical Analysis as Tool 
In order to analyze the tacit knowledge and “way of seeing” that is transmitted through 
the text, rhetorical analysis is an appropriate method because it is through rhetoric that tacit 
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knowledge and attitudes can be conveyed. For this purpose, I draw from Perelman and 
Olbrechts-Tyteca’s (1969) notions of disconnection and dissociation, extending them also to 
connection and association. Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca describe disconnection as occurring 
when two elements are described independently even though they have been connected—in the 
rhetor’s view, improperly—in the past. Dissociation is similar to disconnection in that it also 
results in independent descriptions of two elements, but dissociation is more pronounced than 
disconnection: it is “no more a question of breaking the links that join independent elements, 
but of modifying the very structure of those elements” (Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca, 1969, p. 
412).  With a structural change through dissociation, connecting the elements in the future 
becomes more difficult. Likewise, connection is about connecting elements that were previously 
disconnected, and association is about restructuring thoughts. The goal in dissociation is to 
modify the elements’ structures to make it impossible to connect the elements in the future, 
and the goal of association is to modify the elements’ structures to make it impossible to 
disconnect the elements in the future.  Rhetorical association/dissociation needs to be 
differentiated from connection/disconnection because the former is evidence of restructuring 
the organization of “seeing that” which Hanson (1958) describes, while the latter is not 
necessarily.  
 
Coding of the Text 
 In order to see how the text attempted to reorganize the audience’s way of seeing, I 
made special note of how Neandertals were classified: as Same (Homo sapiens neanderthalensis) 
or as Other (Homo neanderthalensis). The classification is essentially the structural context the 
text operates within—it is how Neandertals are associated with or dissociated from AMHs. After 
noting the context, I coded the text’s explicit discussion of Neandertals, which reveals the 
connective or disconnective moves made in the text. The majority of my analysis is about the 
text’s connective and disconnective moves, but those rhetorical moves build toward an 
understanding of the larger (dis)associative moves.  
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To code for connections and disconnections, I first extracted every paragraph that 
contained the word “Neandertal” and created an electronic document with only those 
paragraphs. On the first read of those paragraphs, I looked for how that structural context was 
either reinforced or undermined by placing each paragraph broadly into the categories of 
“neutral/both connections and disconnection,” “connection,” or “disconnection.” These overall 
categories were about the paragraphs as whole units—some paragraphs had both internal 
connections and disconnections but were still placed in one category or the other based on the 
overall message of the paragraph. However, any internal inconsistencies in the paragraph were 
also noted.  
Next, I coded the internal elements of the paragraphs. This step was broken down into 
three sub-steps. First, I coded the paragraphs inductively, not knowing what categories would 
arise. Although unaware as to what specific categories would emerge at this stage, I still placed 
the emerging categories into the broader “neutral/both connection and disconnection,” 
“connection,” or “disconnection” categories. After going through the paragraphs in this way, I 
read through all of the codes that emerged in order to find patterns. Some of the more specific 
categories I combined—“burial of the dead” and “use of tools,” for example, were combined 
under the larger category of “behavior” (although the sub-categories were still noted). Other 
categories had to be divided further. For example, in my original codes, I had noted “use of the 
term Homo sapiens.” However, Homo sapiens was not used in all the paragraphs in the same 
way—in some paragraphs, Homo sapiens referred directly to Neandertals, but in others, the 
term was applied to anatomically modern humans as a way to compare Us and Them. Thus, I 
had to go back through the coded paragraphs and differentiate between these uses of the term.  
The categories that emerged at this point included both the content of the text (explicit 
connection or discussion) as well as the concrete language of the text (more implicit connection 
or disconnection). After deciding the codes based on these emergent categories, I went through 
every paragraph again in order to code for anything that I had missed on the first read. Finally, 
as a precaution, I used the “control find” feature in my electronic document to search for the 
specific words I was coding for. I am thus able to say with certainty, for example, that I indeed 
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coded for every use of the word “tool” that appeared in a paragraph with the word 
“Neandertal.” Categories that emerged through my coding are provided in the Appendix.  
 
Analysis of Codes and Data 
 After determining codes, I counted the most salient instances of each. I did this both at 
the paragraph level and the sentence level. Knowing what categories were weighted the most, I 
then took the time to look more qualitatively at what was happening within each category and 
in what ways the categories and codes interacted with one another.  Within the results section, I 
offer a brief analysis of these results alongside the data.  
Finally, I compared the second edition of the text to the third. First, I figured out if there 
were any structural changes between the texts in how Neandertals were viewed—i.e., I noted if 
Neandertals were associated with or dissociated from AMHs through their classification as a 
species and if that classification was the same as the second edition. If the species classification 
system changed between editions, the change would be evidence of a shift in a paradigm, in the 
“way of seeing” Neandertals, ourselves, and all species. Next, I went through each paragraph 
and compared the language, noting any changes to how Neandertals are connected to or 
disconnected from AMHs. After noting the changes made to the Neandertal paragraphs in the 
third edition of the text, I used the same codes from the second edition of the book to note how 
the presentation of Neandertals has subtly shifted over a small amount of time—between 2011 
and 2014.  
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RESULTS AND DISCUSSION OF RHETORICALLY ANALYZING CLARK LARSEN’S OUR ORIGINS 
 Analysis of Clark Larsen’s Our Origins revealed rhetorical tension within the discussion 
of Neandertals as similar to or different from AMHs. In many ways, Larsen’s text is neutral, not 
explicitly favoring either view of Neandertals. In the text’s second edition, the appearance of 
neutrality can be found within Larsen’s choice of classification models, use of disciplinary 
language, and relatively equal weighing of connections and disconnections. However, much of 
the text’s rhetoric moved readers to be more accepting of the connections between AMHs and 
Neandertals. The move toward connection can be seen in structural elements of the text and its 
use of language of positivity, certainty and probability, conjecture, and doubt. When it comes to 
Neandertals, the connective rhetoric of Larsen’s second edition of the text debates its surface 
neutrality, but the debate is hidden. Much of the debate surrounding Neandertals is implicit in 
the text, a move which shows an understanding of the consensus—a necessary move in order to 
change that consensus. In the third edition of the text, how the consensus has changed is 
apparent—the text actually changes how it classifies Neandertals from one edition to the next, a 
change that we begin to see in the second edition, but that is still subtly resisted in the third 
edition.  
 
Analysis of Larsen’s 2011 Our Origins: An In-Depth Rhetorical Analysis 
Origin and Classification Models: Appearance of Neutrality 
In the second edition of Our Origins, Larsen does not directly confront the “Neandertal 
debate” at all, perhaps due to genre constraints; delving into the arguments about Neandertal 
classification in an introductory textbook could detract from the text’s main purpose of 
introducing students to the field of physical anthropology. However, evasiveness of the issue is 
also a rhetorically effective move to make the text appealing to both instructors who favor a 
view of Neandertals as Other and instructors who favor a view of Neandertals as Same. The text 
appears, at first glance, to be neutral on the question of how to classify Neandertals. Although 
not explicitly discussed, the text does gesture toward the Neandertal classification debate in its 
discussion of the competing models for human origins—the Out-of-Africa model, which 
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positions Neandertals as a species separate from H. sapiens, and the Multiregional model, which 
positions Neandertals as the same species as us (De Vos, 2009, p. 365). The text equally weighs 
both models, expanding on the evidence for or against each in chapter 12. Larsen writes: 
The fossil record and the genetic record indicate . . . that neither the Out-of-Africa 
model nor the Multiregional Continuity model adequately explains modern humans' 
origins. The Out-of-Africa model correctly accounts for the origin of modern human 
variation, but it incorrectly asserts that no gene flow occurred between Neandertals and 
modern Homo sapiens. The Multiregional Continuity model is not correct about modern 
H. sapiens' regional development. However, it is correct about gene flow and the notion 
that Neandertals have contributed to modern H. sapiens' gene pool. In other words, 
elements of both models explain the emergence and evolution of fully modern people 
worldwide in the Upper Pleistocene. (395) 
Larsen then goes on to describe the Assimilation model, which is presented as combining the 
correct parts from both models. Thus, it appears in Larsen’s text that some sort of middle 
ground has been reached concerning humanity’s origins, which is a somewhat simplified 
version of the current discussion in the scientific community. Chris Stringer, whom Larsen cited 
as the main proponent of the Out-of-Africa model, has conceded that due to new discoveries 
from advances in DNA research, the Assimilation model may be appropriate, but he is still 
insistent on stressing “a strong African predominance” (Stringer, 2014, p. 249) within the 
Assimilation model. Thus, as opposed to advocating for the Assimilation model, Stringer 
pushes for the idea that “we are all out-of-Africanists who accept some multiregional 
contributions” (251). Essentially, Stringer advocates for anthropologists to “see that” the 
African origins of humanity are more important than the gene flow that occurred between 
AMHs and other populations, like the Neandertals. There may be “general agreement that 
modern humans originated in Africa” (Villa & Roebroeks, 2014, p. 1), but how much to stress 
the origin over possible gene flow is debatable. By choosing to offer a favorable view of the 
Assimilation model, Larsen appears objective, not taking a direct stance on if origins or gene 
flow is more important.   
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Larsen’s discussion of the Out-of-Africa and Multiregional models, however, does reveal 
an implicit favoring of genetic similarity over our African origins. This implicit favoring of 
similarity is found in the structure of how Larsen presents the correctness of each model. Order 
of information changes what is stressed in a text; Williams and Bizup (2014) advise writers to 
put information that they want to stress toward the end of a sentence, and this same logic can 
also be applied at the paragraph level (and even at the level of the entire text)— the idea put 
last is stressed. In Larsen’s text, the discussion about the Out-of-Africa model begins with how 
the model is correct and ends with how it is incorrect. The discussion about the Multiregional 
Continuity model is structurally presented the opposite—first, readers are informed of how the 
model fails and then are told how it succeeds (395). Thus, the Out-of-Africa model, which 
presents Neandertals as Other, has its failure stressed, and the Multiregional Continuity model, 
which presents Neandertals as Same, has its success stressed.  
In addition to the text’s favoring of the Assimilation model, the text’s explicit favoring 
of anatomical classification also makes it appear unbiased even while the rhetoric points 
readers toward a favoring of connection to Neandertals. The author recognizes that “many 
anthropologists are shifting to genetic classification” (176), which is the classification system 
that generally “sees that” Neandertals are Homo sapiens.  However, the text’s focus on 
adaptation combined with the knowledge that “humans have taken a very different adaptive 
trajectory than apes” (176) leads to Larsen’s justification for using anatomical, and not genetic, 
classification. Such a decision aligns with the disciplinary standards for the subject since 
morphology has most consistently been used to identify Neandertals (White et al., 2014, p. 33). 
Thus, using anatomical classification is a way to align the text with the current consensus, a 
consensus that tends to dissociate Neandertals and AMHs. However, in the consensus, the 
uniqueness of anatomically modern humans is presented as a given; our adaptation as 
“different” is assumed. That assumption is used to shape the classification of all species in the 
text. The paradigm of human uniqueness certainty is, as Villa and Roebroeks (2014) had 
warned, influencing interpretations of other species.  
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Because Larsen’s text used anatomical classification, its use of the word “hominid” must 
be understood as more exclusive than when “hominid” is used within genetic classification 
systems. The older, anatomical use of the word refers only to species within the human 
evolutionary lineage while its newer, genetic use signals humans and all of the African apes. 
Thus, when Larsen refers to Neandertals as “hominids” in 12 paragraphs of the text, he 
excludes other living primates from the discussion. Larsen’s use of the term “hominid” creates 
a greater connection between AMHs and Neandertals than the term would have had within a 
genetic classification system.  
 
Naming of Neandertals 
Although Larsen explicitly addresses the decision to use anatomical classification and 
how he uses the term “hominid,” he never explicitly addresses the use of “Homo sapien” in 
relation to Neandertals. The text does make it clear that the Multiregional model views 
Neandertals as being Homo sapiens and that Multiregional is correct in its assertions about gene 
flow between the populations, but the intricacies of how to view the gene flow are not 
mentioned. Instead, the text presents Neandertals as the same species as us without 
clarification that doing so is debatable. This move actually contradicts the text’s decision to use 
anatomical classification, but the text never addresses the contradiction. Additionally, choosing 
to classify Neandertals as Homo sapiens might be in violation of the common view. De Vos 
(2009) was confident enough to claim there was a “consensus that Neanderthal Man is another 
species.” (p. 376). However, more recently, White, Gowlett, and Grove (2014, p. 32), citing De 
Vos, softened the claim by saying that there is a “preference” to classify Neandertals as a 
distinct species. Larsen’s text ignores these debates even when it blatantly goes against the 
“preference,” referring to Neandertals as Homo sapiens in 16 paragraphs. For example, in one 
paragraph, Larsen writes about “modern humans” meeting a member of “their species—the 
Neandertals” (395). The choice to call Neandertals Homo sapiens without comment occludes the 
contentious nature of the classification and, when considered in the larger conversation about 
Neandertals, favors similarities. 
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In addition to referring to Neandertals as H. sapiens, the text also calls Neandertals 
“human” in at least eight paragraphs and “people” (or “person”) in at least five paragraphs.3 The 
use of the terms “human” and “person” are technically correct whether or not Neandertals are 
viewed as the same species as us or a separate species from us. The term “person” is defined as 
“a human being” (“Person,” n.d.), and the term “human” denotes “belonging to the species 
Homo sapiens or other (extinct) species of the genus Homo” (“Human,” n.d.). However, because 
this text is introductory, the use of the terms “person” and “human” must be understood in a 
non-technical sense as well. Both terms are used in everyday language, and everyday language 
does not usually refer to extinct species from the genus Homo. Thus, the terms can reasonably 
be thought of as having heightened connective connotations than their denotations reveal, so 
when applied to Neandertals, a connection is implied.  
Another definition of “human” relates to “the abilities or sphere of activity of human as 
opposed to supernatural beings; mundane, worldly; imperfect, fallible” (“Human,” n.d.). This 
definition of human is much more humble than our more egotistical scientific name, which in 
its full-form includes our own sub-species classification as Homo sapiens sapiens. Homo 
translates from Latin as “man” and sapiens translates as “wise” or “intelligent” (“Homo 
sapiens,” 2015), so our sub-species classification translates roughly as “wise, wise, man.” The 
Neandertal scientific naming is Homo sapiens neanderthalensis (or, in classification systems 
with Neandertals as a separate species, simply Homo neanderthalensis), a named derived from 
Neander Vally in Germany, where the first remains to be interpreted as belonging to a distinct 
species were discovered. AMHs are imbued with wisdom while Neandertals are attached to a 
specific location—the naming signals our own importance and diminishes Neandertals’. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 Due to time constraints, I was unable to use the “control find” feature described in the 
methods section as a precautionary check for three words: people, person, and human. 
Although the numbers reported are accurate to the extent that they are certainly not less than 
what I have reported, there may have been relevant usages of the terms that I did not count. 
The term “human,” for example, appears in so many contexts—not just in relation to 
Neandertals—that cross-checking for any missed instances would have involved sorting 
through many uses of the term that are not relevant for this study. When discussing these three 
terms, I have used the phrase “at least” to signal the specific limitation of my results. However, 
as more instances of the words I was unable to check would actually strengthen my 
conclusions, this limitation does not undermine the results of this study. 
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However, the term “human” is probably used more often in everyday speech than the term 
“Homo sapiens,” and although “human” is not used to always denote the humbling idea of 
fallibility, fallibility is still associated with the word.4 Such an association may be activated in a 
language user’s mind, regardless of what meaning the writer or speaker intended (Tabossi, 
1988). In relation to Larsen’s text, the decision to refer to Neandertals as “human” not only 
connects them to us, but also humbles them and us through the word’s associated definitions.  
Associated definitions of the words “archaic” and “modern” also rhetorically shape the 
view of Neandertals. Larsen’s text often differentiates Us and Them through these words—we 
are “modern Homo sapiens” and Neandertals are “archaic Homo sapiens.” This rhetorical choice 
might have been made in order to relate to the audience; “modern” and “archaic” are words an 
introductory student would already be familiar with whereas sub-species classifications might 
be too detailed for an introductory text (and also too wordy, perhaps). The use of the terms also 
properly introduces the students to terminology since “archaic” and “modern” are used by 
physical anthropologists writing for more specialized audiences. Larsen gives the specialized 
definition of “modern” as “based on a series of distinctive anatomical characteristics that 
contrast with archaic characteristics found in earlier hominids. Modern people—people who 
essentially look like us—tend to have a high, vertical forehead, a round and tall skull, small 
browridges, a small face, small teeth, and a projecting chin”  (358-359).  
Although instructors who chose Larsen’s text would already be aware of and the 
students using the text would be made aware of the specialized definition of “modern,” the 
layman definition of “modern” may still be activated through the use of the term. In layman’s 
terms, modern is defined as “being in existence at this time; current, present” (“Modern,” n.d.). 
The layman definition of “archaic” might also be activated; it is defined as “marked by the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 The terms “Homo sapien” and “human” reveal that cultural tradition may not be entirely to 
blame for the paradigmatic view of ourselves as “unique and special”—the scientific naming of 
ourselves is actually much more egotistical than the common cultural naming of ourselves. This 
is perhaps related to the etymology of the words; “human” dates as far back as 1119 (“Human,” 
n.d.) while “Homo sapien” was not used until 1802 (“Homo sapiens,” 2015). Because this study’s 
main focus is on what is currently happening with rhetoric in relation to AMHs and 
Neandertals, the historical trajectory of these words is outside the scope of this study.  
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characteristics of an earlier period; old-fashioned, primitive” (“Archaic,” n.d.). The more 
common meanings of the words “modern” and “archaic” thus position AMHs as existing more 
recently than Neandertals, even though the populations co-existed for “at least several 
thousand years” (Larsen, 2011, p. 392). The very basic terminology thus undermines the 
temporal connection between Neandertals and AMHs. Furthermore, the close relationship 
between the words “archaic” and “primitive” proves problematic when considering some of the 
definitions of the word “primitive”: “simple, unsophisticated, or crude things or people as a 
class . . . an uncivilized, unintelligent, or uncouth person” (“Primitive,” n.d.). The cultural 
meaning of Neandertal as “idiot” is embedded within the scientific terminology.  
The word “archaic” and its associated “primitive” also encode a scientifically old-
fashioned, but culturally popular, way of thinking about evolution—as progressive.5 Other 
definitions for “primitive” include “the earliest stages; the beginnings” and “a thing from which 
something else is derived” (“Primitive,” n.d.). Evolution does not have any end goal, but the 
familiar illustration of the “march of progress” that features “a parade of ape-like hominids 
leading up to some . . . representation of the modern human form” (Lessl, 2007, p. 126) 
persists. The word “primitive” may not be used to define directly Neandertals, but some of its 
meaning lingers in the naming “archaic Homo sapiens.”  
Larsen, although certainly not responsible for this naming system, reproduces it: at least 
37 paragraphs differentiate between Neandertals and some variant of “modern H. sapiens” or 
“modern humans.”  Additionally, the distinction between “modern” and “archaic” should 
inform the observation reported above that Neandertals are often referred to as being H. 
sapiens; although true that Neandertals are called Homo sapiens in 16 paragraphs, the word 
“archaic” was paired with “Homo sapiens” in all of those paragraphs. Thus, even when explicitly 
presented as being the Same species as us, Neandertals are Other because they are “archaic,” a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 Evolution does not have a goal, so the notion of “progress” doesn’t really make sense within 
the scheme; “It is tempting to see evolution as a grand progressive ladder with Homo 
sapiens emerging at the top. But evolution produces a tree, not a ladder — and we are just one 
of many twigs on the tree” (“Understanding Evolution,” 2015).  
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word that in its jargonistic sense refers to anatomy but that also, through its more common 
usage, can signify primitiveness and all the baggage that comes with such an association.  
 
Proportion of Connective to Disconnective Paragraphs 
Although disciplinary terms and norms partly shape Larsen’s text’s presentation of 
Neandertals, the text still defies the historical presentation of Neandertals as Other and 
approaches a representation closer to what Julia Drell (2000) describes as “same but other” (20). 
In total, 41 paragraphs form an overall connection between modern humans and Neandertals, 
which is comparable to the 37 paragraphs that form an overall disconnection between the two 
groups (15 paragraphs are neutral). Although these numbers represent what paragraphs are 
doing overall in regards to connection and disconnection, the paragraphs do not only form 
connections and disconnections. Of the 41 connective paragraphs, 13 also mention some sort 
of disconnective information, although the disconnective information within those 13 
paragraphs is not stressed enough to overcome the paragraphs’ overall connective ties between 
AMHs and Neandertals. Of the 37 overall disconnective paragraphs, 10 also mention some sort 
of connective information, although the connective information within those 10 paragraphs is 
not stressed enough to overcome the paragraphs’ overall disconnective ties (Table 1).  
 
Table 1. 
Proportion of Connective to Disconnective Paragraphs 
 
Overall paragraph type Sub-paragraph type Number of paragraphs 
Connective  40 
Connective with internal disconnections 13 
Disconnective 37 
Disconnective with internal connections 10 
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Thus, not only is the text about as equally as likely to connect Neandertals and AMHs as it is to 
disconnect the groups, the text is also about as equally as likely to complicate the connective 
and disconnective paragraphs. The roughly equal split reflects the active debate on how to view 
Neandertals. Larsen’s approach to equally weigh disconnection and connection would be a non-
contentious approach to an issue that is not quite agreed upon. 
 
Proportion of Topics: Morphology and Behavior 
Although connective information is just as likely to appear as disconnective information 
in the second edition of the textbook, the text does not equally present certain topics in 
connective and disconnective frameworks. In total, 50 paragraphs mention Neandertal 
morphology, which is a large portion of the total 93 paragraphs that discuss Neandertals. In 
contrast, a total of 37 paragraphs discuss Neandertal behavior, which is still a large portion of 
the text, but not as large as the focus on morphology. Such an intense focus on morphology 
should be expected given that Larsen’s text uses anatomical classification for species 
delineations. Within the two topic areas of morphology and behavior, connections and 
disconnections are further attached to certain sub-categories.   
Neandertal morphology. Overall, 7 of the 50 morphology paragraphs are either neutral 
or both connective/disconnective, 16 are connective, and 27 are disconnective. This same 
pattern generally holds at the sentence level, with 13 paragraphs using morphology as either 
neutral information or for both connection and disconnection, 12 paragraphs using 
morphology as connective information, and 25 paragraphs using morphology as disconnective 
information (Table 2). The move to more often frame morphology as a difference between 
AMHs and Neandertals is not surprising—even the commonly used name “anatomically modern 
humans” differentiates us from Neandertals via morphology. 
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Table 2. 
Neandertal Morphology as Compared to AMH Morphology  
 
Within the discussion of how AMHs and Neandertals morphologically differ, adaptation 
is mentioned in six separate paragraphs. Again, this was to be expected since Larsen’s text 
approaches Neandertals within a framework of understanding adaptation. Some sort of physical 
pathology is also mentioned six times, which harkens back to the earliest days of Neandertal 
interpretation, when the remains were framed as belonging to aberrant Homo sapiens. Although 
the physical differences are now accepted as normal for Neandertals, the text still mentions the 
physical problems evident in the remains. For example, one paragraph explains how “the 
majority of Neandertal skeletons have injuries” due to “accidents and violence” (370). This 
tendency to tie the physical morphology back to behavior is typical in these paragraphs. 
Arthritis in one Neandertal’s feet, for instance is hypothesized to “have resulted from the 
constant stresses of traversing difficult, mountainous terrain” (369).  
 Outweighing the paragraphs that mention pathology and adaptation within a context of 
morphological differences is the sub-category of skull morphology. The morphology of the 
skull appears as evidence of Neandertal Otherness in 13 separate paragraphs. The Neandertal 
skull is characterized as having “a very wide nasal aperture, a projecting midface, and occipital 
bun, and a low, long skull” (373). The “occipital bun” refers to “a more projecting occipital 
Level of Connection 
or Disconnection 
Neandertal 
relation to AMHs 
Number of 
paragraphs 
Most Repeated Topics (in 
number of paragraphs) 
   
Paragraph  Neutral or Both 7 
 
 
Connective 16 
 
 
Disconnective  27 
 
 
Sentence  Neutral or Both 13 
 
 
Connective 12 Vagueness (5)  
Behavior (7) 
 
Disconnective  25 Adaptation (6) 
Pathology (6) 
Skull morphology (13) 
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bone” (Larsen, 2011, p. 359), and although some modern populations have an occipital bun (“All 
of us have a touch of Neandertal,” 2012), the term is still defined as a “cranial feature of 
Neandertals” (Larsen, 2011, p. 359). The other features that are presented as typical of the 
Neandertal skull are also defined in opposition to AMHs, even when some modern populations 
have those features. The size of the Neandertal nasal aperture alone is referenced in nine 
paragraphs; it is called “enormous” in one paragraph (373), “large” in two paragraphs (370 and 
374), “wide” in five paragraphs (366, 367, 369, 371, and 373), and “wider” in one paragraph 
(359). Of course, what is meant by “wide” is “wide as compared to what has been defined as 
modern,” and “modern” is simply a series of features that Larsen says appear in “people who 
essentially look like us” (358-359); the “modern” nasal aperture is described as “narrow” (388-
389, 390, and 391), so people with narrow noses are presented as “us.”  
Although a “wide” nasal aperture is referenced throughout the text as a defining 
Neandertal characteristic, Larsen recognizes that “many people around the world today have 
wide, big noses” and that the feature is not “uniquely Neandertal” (373). This one paragraph 
does draw a connection between Neandertal and AMH morphology, but the sheer number of 
paragraphs that define a “wide nose” as a Neandertal feature overshadows the one paragraph’s 
morphological connection about the nasal aperture. It must be recognized that including a 
“wide” nose as a defining Neandertal characteristic is outside Larsen’s control—this is a move 
of the discipline, not an individual writer.  Reproducing the disciplinary standard to present 
wide noses as “not modern” does more to exclude people with wide noses from the category of 
“modern” than Larsen is able to offset with any individual paragraph that connects Neandertal 
noses to modern populations.  
 When Larsen’s text successfully moves the reader toward connecting AMH and 
Neandertal morphology, it most often does so by being vague about what morphological 
similarities the two groups share. Of the 12 paragraphs that use morphology as connective 
information, 5 never specify the exact features that AMHs have in common with Neandertals. 
For instance, one paragraph simply states that “Neandertals looked very similar to modern 
humans in many respects” (374) without further clarification. The page in which that paragraph 
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appears does not offer clarification in any surrounding paragraphs, which are equally as 
vague—the visual elements on the page are presented as self-evident in regards to the 
similarities, with one figure caption of a Neandertal reconstruction reading, “Some of the 
morphological traits associated with Neandertals can be found in modern humans” (374).  
The text also presents morphological similarities by blurring the line between 
morphology and behavior, a move that occurs in 7 of the 12 paragraphs containing 
morphological similarities. For instance, in order to talk—a behavior that is often cited as 
evidence of our uniqueness from other living species—a certain anatomy is required. One 
paragraph in Larsen’s text describes the Kebara Neandertal hyoid bone: “various muscles and 
ligaments attach it to the skull, mandible, tongue, larynx, and pharynx, collectively producing 
speech . . . The morphology of the Kebara Neandertal’s hypoid is identical to that of a living 
human’s. The Kebara people talked” (379). In such paragraphs, the artificial nature of my own 
categorization is made apparent—behavior and morphology are linked, a fact that is often 
undermined through taxonomic systems.  
Neandertal behavior. In contrast to Neandertal morphology, Neandertal behavior is 
more often presented in a connective context. Of the 37 paragraphs that discuss Neandertal 
behavior, 25 are connective and 12 are disconnective. The higher number of behavioral 
connections is also reflected at the sentence level, with 6 paragraphs using behavior for both 
connections/disconnections, 21 paragraphs using behavior as connective information, and 10 
paragraphs using behavior as disconnective information (Table 3). That behavior is more likely 
than morphology to connect AMHs and Neandertals aligns with Julia Drell’s (2000) assessment 
that since the 1970s, Neandertal interpretation has become much more scientifically Same in 
terms of behavior—this connection with Neandertals has not eroded over time.  
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Table 3. 
 
Neandertal Behavior as Compared to AMH Behavior  
 
As compared to the information connecting Neandertal and AMHs morphology, the 
information connecting Neandertal and AMH behavior is much less vague. Only one paragraph 
mentions how Neandertal and AMH behavior is similar without explaining how or why. One 
behavior used to link Neandertals and AMHs was their burial of the dead, a behavior cited in six 
separate paragraphs. Using burial of the dead to link Neandertal and AMH behavior gained 
popularity in the 1970s (Drell, 2000, p. 16), and Larsen’s text showed that it is still used to 
connect us to Neandertals today. For example, in one paragraph, Larsen wrote that the La 
Chapelle-aux-Saints Neandertal “provides evidence of intentional burial. When this individual 
was found in a pit, it was the first suggestion that Neandertals cared for their dead in a way 
similar to modern humans' methods” (379). The word “intentional” is repeated in connection to 
burial of the dead in two other paragraphs (369 and 406), and the phrase “purposeful behavior” 
is used in another (378-379). Thus, Neandertals are presented in these paragraphs as self-aware 
and intentional in their behavior.    
The production or use of material culture by Neandertals is also commonly cited as a 
similarity in behavior, appearing in eight total paragraphs. For example, one paragraph begins 
by stating, “Modern humans use symbolism in countless contexts” and ends by describing how 
Neandertals made body ornaments by painting marine shells that they then likely strung 
Level of Connection 
or Disconnection 
Neandertal 
relation to AMHs 
Number of 
paragraphs 
Most Repeated Topics (in 
number of paragraphs) 
   
Paragraph  Neutral or Both 0 
 
 
Connective 25 
 
 
Disconnective  12 
 
 
Sentence  Neutral or Both 6 
 
 
Connective 21 
 
Burial of the dead (6) 
Material culture (8)  
 
Disconnective  10 Cannibalism (3)  
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around their necks. Thus, the text states, Neandertals likely engaged in symbolic behavior “at 
least 10,000 years before the appearance of modern H. sapiens in Europe” (379-381). In addition 
to symbolic material culture, tools made and used by Neandertals are also described. The 
specific stone tool culture used by Neandertals is actually given a unique name within 
anthropology—Mousterian (376). The naming thus sets Neandertals apart from other species, 
but not in quite the same way the specialized term “occipital bun” does. While the “occipital 
bun” is defined partly by being a protrusion as compared to most AMHs, the Mousterian stone 
tool culture is not compared against modern humans. Instead, Mousterian tools are allowed to 
stand by themselves as a testament to the Neandertals’ ability to use a specific technique 
indicative of their ability to “visualize the shape and size of a tool from a stone core, an 
advanced cognitive ability” (377).  
  In contrast to the clear categories that appear when looking at how Neandertals are 
behaviorally connected to AMHs, examples of Neandertal behavior differing from AMHs do not 
fall repeatedly into any unique and distinct categories besides one: cannibalism. In total, 
cannibalism is mentioned in three separate paragraphs. Even though cannibalism has been well 
documented among some AMH populations, the text avoids directly relating modern humans to 
the behavior. While the text is so careful to make it clear that wide noses are not “uniquely 
Neandertal” (373), the same move is not made when it comes to cannibalism. The text almost 
moves readers in that direction: “The Krapina Neandertals were not the only ones to practice 
cannibalism” (372). However, the Krapina cannibalism is then related to cannibalism of 
Neandertals at other locations, not to the behavior of modern humans, which indicates a 
discomfort in connecting ourselves to this behavior.  
 
Textbook Structure: Uneven Distribution of Connective and Disconnective Information 
In addition to connections and disconnections being unevenly distributed within topic 
areas, connections and disconnections are unevenly distrusted throughout the text as a whole. 
The paragraphs are about the same in number, but the disconnective paragraphs tend to appear 
earlier in the text and the connective paragraphs tend to appear later in the text: 24 of the 37 
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overall disconnection paragraphs appear in the text’s first half of paragraphs concerning 
Neandertals, and 28 of the 41 overall connection paragraphs appear in the text’s second half of 
paragraphs concerning Neandertals (Table 4).   
Thus, Larsen’s text gradually moves the reader from the idea that Neandertals are 
dissimilar to and different from modern humans toward the idea that Neandertals are similar 
to humans. This writing move aligns with a technique to create coherence in writing—place 
information familiar to readers, “old” information, before new information (Williams & Bizup, 
2014). Because there is a general scientific “preference” (if not a consensus) to view Neandertals 
as a distinct species, the ways Neandertals and AMHs differ would be considered “old” 
information to anthropologists. Indeed, besides a brief period of greater identification with 
Neandertals in the 1970s, the tendency since 1864 has been to think of Neandertals as a 
different species from AMHs. The general audience of the introductory textbook would share 
this tendency to view Neandertals as Other, although perhaps in an exaggerated form from 
anthropologists. Even if a desire to present “old” information first is what motivated Larsen to 
put disconnective information first, the effect of such a move should also be considered. By 
putting the connective information toward the end of the book, connections are stressed, which 
could help offset any preconceived views about Neandertals.  
 
Table 4. 
Distribution of Connective and Disconnective Paragraphs 
 
 
  
Overall paragraph type Total  Number in text’s first half 
(and percentage) 
Number in text’s second half 
(and percentage) 
Connective  41 13 (~32%) 28 (~68%) 
Disconnective 37 24 (~65%) 13 (~35%) 
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Positive Language  
Because the textbook’s readers would be likely to hold preconceived notions of 
Neandertals as Other, they might negatively view information that contradicts this view. Such a 
tendency is combated in the text through language of positivity. Positivity was identified based 
on the denotations and connotations of words. For example, “fascinating” is a word that almost 
always is used to present information in a positive light. The word “technique” was also coded 
as positive language; although defined generally as a “way of doing something,” it also is 
defined as a “the formal or practical aspect of any art, occupation, or field” (“Technique,” n.d.). 
Informally, people even say that something takes a “certain technique” to mean that it takes a 
learned and practice skill. The word thus has connotations of requiring some sort of cognitive 
ability, and the word is also used generally in the context of human achievement. A complete 
list of the words identified as positive is included in the Appendix. In total, 19 of the 
paragraphs contain language imbued with positivity. Of the 19 paragraphs, 2 are neutral, 13 
form overall connections, and 4 form disconnections. These paragraphs have very similar 
numbers at the sentence level— 1 paragraph uses positive language in relation to neutral 
information, 15 use positive language in relation to connective information, and 3 use positive 
language in relation to disconnective information (Table 5). The text thus creates a positive 
association between Neandertals and AMHs.  
Of the 19 paragraphs with positive language, 10 attach positivity to behavior (367, 369, 
376 [three paragraphs on the same page], 376-378, 377, 381, 392, and 395). All 10 of these 
paragraphs use the information about Neandertal behavior as a connection between 
Neandertals and AMHs. For example, one paragraph states that “sometime within 200,000-
100,000 yBP,” modern H. sapiens encountered the Neandertals, “who were as behaviorally and 
technologically complex as they” (395). (The phrase “technologically complex” signifies a 
positive view Neandertals.)  
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Table 5. 
Positive Language Attached to Neandertal Descriptions  
 
Positive language is also attached to information about physical morphology in 5 (370, 
373, 376, 378, and 406) of the total 19 paragraphs with positive language. One of those 
paragraphs (370) attaches the positivity to information that neither connects nor disconnects 
Neandertal and AMH morphology, three paragraphs attach positivity to language that describes 
similarities between AMH and Neandertal morphology, and one paragraph attaches positive 
language to information that highlights differences between Neandertal and AMHs morphology. 
One of the paragraphs that positively connect Neandertal morphology to AMH 
morphology (376) also discusses a Neandertal behavior, tool making; the paragraph describes 
the Neandertal hand’s “size, shape, and articulations” as reflecting “the kind of precise manual 
dexterity crucial for the fine-crafting of tools” (376). The other two paragraphs that attach 
positivity to similarities between AMH and Neandertal morphology (373 and 378) both discuss 
Neandertal adaptation. Thus, similarities in physical morphology were positively described in 
these paragraphs, but only in larger contexts of behavior or adaptation.  
The paragraph with positive language tied to differences between AMH and Neandertal 
morphology explains that “the fundamental details of modern human anatomy probably have a 
single place of origin” (406), meaning Neandertals did not contribute to what Larsen calls the 
“fundamental” anatomy of AMHs. However, the same sentence undermines the disconnection 
Level of Connection 
or Disconnection 
Neandertal 
relation to AMHs 
Number of 
paragraphs 
Repeated Topics (in number of 
paragraphs) 
   
Paragraph  Neutral or Both 2 
 
 
Connective 13 
 
 
Disconnective  4 
 
 
Sentence  Neutral or Both 1 
 
Physical morphology (1) 
Connective 15 
 
Behavior (10) 
Physical morphology (3) 
 
Disconnective  3 Physical morphology (1)  
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by continuing, “but Neandertals later contributed to the European gene pool. Neandertals are 
part of modern humans’ ancestry” (406). Thus, although the text frames the differences in 
morphology as “fundamental,” it does not dwell upon those differences.  
 
Language of Certainty and Probability 
In addition to offsetting the audience’s tendency to negatively view information that 
contradicts the “modern humans as unique” paradigm, Larsen’s text offsets skepticism toward 
connection through language of certainty and probability. Certainty was identified based on the 
confidence attached to a word. For example, to “conclude” something is to have more 
confidence in it than to “suggest” it. (See the Appendix for a complete list of words attached to 
certainty and probability.) The more certain the language, the more likely the paragraph is to be 
discussing connections between modern humans and Neandertals.  Of the 31 paragraphs that 
contain the strongest language of certainty, 3 paragraphs are neutral or form both 
connections/disconnections, 19 form an overall connection between AMH and Neandertals, and 
9 form an overall disconnection between the two groups. The certainty established at the 
paragraph level generally matches the certainty at the sentence level:  3 paragraphs attach 
certainty to neutral or both connective/disconnective information, 18 paragraphs attach 
certainty to connective information, and 10 paragraphs attach certainty to disconnective 
information (Table 6).  
The 32 paragraphs that use language of probability are also more likely to discuss 
similarities between Neandertals and AMH: 4 paragraphs are neutral or form connections and 
disconnections, 19 form overall connections, and 9 form overall disconnections. Like certainty, 
the sentence level matches the paragraph level for language of probability: 5 paragraphs use 
language of probability in relation to neutral or both connective/disconnective information, 16 
attach probability to connective information, and 11 attach probability to disconnective 
information (Table 7). 
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Table 6. 
Language of Certainty Attached to Neandertal Descriptions  
 
Table 7. 
 
Language of Probability Attached to Neandertal Descriptions 
 
 
Using language of certainty and probability, the text thus answers an anticipated 
skepticism toward viewing Neandertals as similar to modern humans—the higher chance of 
encountering one of these “confirmation” words with information about similarities could lead 
the audience to start associating connective information with confirmation that the information 
is fairly certain or probable. The associations might not create an overall greater degree of 
connection than disconnection to Neandertals, however. Since the text’s audience is likely to 
Level of Connection 
or Disconnection 
Neandertal 
relation to AMHs 
Number of 
paragraphs 
 
   
Paragraph  Neutral or Both 4 
 
 
Connective 19 
 
 
Disconnective  9 
 
 
Sentence  Neutral or Both 5 
 
 
Connective 16 
 
 
Disconnective  11  
Level of Connection 
or Disconnection 
Neandertal 
relation to AMHs 
Number of 
paragraphs 
 
   
Paragraph  Neutral or Both 3 
 
 
Connective 19 
 
 
Disconnective  9 
 
 
Sentence  Neutral or Both 3 
 
 
Connective 18 
 
 
Disconnective  10  
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view Neandertals as more different than they are similar to AMHs, the association of connection 
with certainty would simply help offset the tendency to Other Neandertals. For example, 
paragraphs that contained the term “evidence” were more likely to discuss similarities—one 
paragraph discussed “evidence found with the Neandertal skeletons” as suggestive “that the 
Neandertals intentionally buried their dead”  (369). Another paragraph used “a growing body of 
archaeological and biological evidence” to demonstrate “that Neandertals were not clumsy 
mental deficients” (375).   
The defensiveness of this last example is also seen in another paragraph that uses 
evidence as a term: “The key point of this discussion of Neandertal characteristics . . . is that 
Neandertals likely were not weird humanlike primates, less adaptable and less intelligent than 
modern humans. The record shows that their behaviors, both in form and in substance, were 
similar to modern humans'. . . The empirical evidence disproves arguments that Neandertals 
were less than human” (381). If Clark Spencer Larsen felt the need to be defensive of the idea 
that Neandertals were “similar to modern humans,” the implication is that the audience was 
expected to come to the text with attitudes expressing the opposite view. Thus, any paragraph 
that discusses similarities had to combat this attitude and tendency to Other Neandertals by 
making it clear that we are certain that Neandertals shared similarities with AMHs. 
 
 Language of Conjecture 
Combating the presumed tendency to Other Neandertals can also be seen in the ways 
the text moves the audience to question the differences between Neandertals and AMHs. In 
contrast to the language of certainty and probability, language that highlights the conjectural 
nature of knowledge is more likely to be used in relation to information concerning differences 
(see the Appendix for a complete list of words). However, that is not to say that conjecture is 
more likely to be highlighted within paragraphs that form an overall disconnection. At the 
paragraph level, conjectural language is more likely to appear within overall connective 
paragraphs (conjectural language appears within 2 neutral paragraphs, 6 connective 
paragraphs, and 3 disconnective paragraphs), but how conjectural information is used within 
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the paragraphs is not generally to form connections. While language of certainty and language 
of probability both have a general match between paragraph-level and sentence-level 
connections or disconnections, of the 11 paragraphs containing conjectural language, 3 attach 
conjecture to connective information (with all 3 paragraphs being connective overall) and 7 
paragraphs use conjecture in relation to disconnective information (with that information 
appearing within 1 neutral paragraph, 3 connective paragraphs, and 4 disconnective 
paragraphs) (Table 8). The conjectural disconnective information appearing within 3 paragraphs 
that were overall about connection contrasts with conjecture tied to connective information 
being, overall, still presented in a larger context of connection. Thus, conjecture about 
connection was softened while conjecture about disconnection was highlighted more often 
through the contextual contrast. 
This information can also be considered in light the internal inconsistencies of the 
connective and disconnective paragraphs; 13 of the 41 connective paragraphs have internal 
disconnections and 10 of the 37 disconnective paragraphs have internal connections (see Table 
1). Because the 10 disconnective paragraphs that contain sentence-level connective information 
do not present any of the connective information as conjectural, there is a qualitative difference 
between the connective and disconnective paragraphs with internal inconsistencies: the 
disconnections within connective paragraphs are approached in a more skeptical way by tying 
the information to conjecture.  Again, this analysis supports the idea that the text is moving the 
reader to question information that highlights differences between AMHs and Neandertals.   
Specifically, the conjectural information frames Neandertals as different from AMHs in 
terms of the behaviors of cannibalism (373), speech (379), and hunting practices (382); physical 
morphology (356); intelligence (379-381); and gene flow (393-394). All of these topics, although 
setting Neandertals apart from AMHs, are only conjecturally framing Neandertals as different.  
Some of these same topics—gene flow (360) and behavior in terms of burial ceremonies (369) 
and tool production (376)—are also used for connective conjectural information.  Thus, even 
though anthropologists may only be able to make conjectures about how similar Neandertals 
and AMHs are in some ways, the conjectural nature of the knowledge is more likely to be  
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Table 8. 
Language of Conjecture Attached to Neandertal Descriptions 
 
highlighted when discussing behaviors or traits that set Neandertals and AMHs apart.  
Additionally, 3 of the 7 disconnective conjectural pieces of information (229-230, 379, and 382) 
mention the names of specific researchers in direct relation to the conjectural piece of 
knowledge while none of the 3 connective conjectural pieces of information directly relate 
researchers to the conjectural knowledge. The claims of disconnection are thus attached more 
to specific people, and specific people are easier to doubt than are free floating claims that 
arose not from people but from, as one connective conjectural claim says, “anthropologists” 
(376) in a general sense.  
 
Language of Uncertainty: Questionable Claims and Doubt 
 Compared to language of certainty, probability, and conjecture (which appear in a total 
of 31, 31, and 11 paragraphs, respectively), language of uncertainty appears significantly less. 
In total, only 5 paragraphs contain language of questionable claims and only 4 paragraphs 
contain language of doubtful claims. At the paragraph level, questionable claims appear in 1 
neutral paragraph, 1 connective paragraph, and 3 disconnective paragraphs. At the sentence 
level, language that highlights the questionable nature of knowledge is used in relation to 1 
Level of Connection 
or Disconnection 
Neandertal 
relation to AMHs 
Number of 
paragraphs 
Type of paragraph (and 
number of each) 
   
Paragraph  Neutral or Both 2 
 
 
Connective 6 
 
 
Disconnective  3 
 
 
Sentence  Neutral or Both 1 
 
 
Connective 3 
 
Connective (3) 
 
Disconnective  7 Neutral (1) 
Connective (3)  
Disconnective (4) 
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piece of neutral information, 2 pieces of connective information, and 2 pieces of disconnective 
information. Language of doubt does not neatly align at the paragraph and sentence level: 
doubtful language appears in 2 connective and 2 disconnective paragraphs, but within those 
paragraphs the doubt was attached to connective information in 1 of the paragraphs and to 
disconnective information in 3 of the paragraphs. The combined totals for both questionable 
claims and doubt are presented under the category “uncertainty” in Table 9. In total, there is a 
greater tendency to attach uncertainty to information that disconnects AMHs and Neandertals.  
Uncertainty and Connection. The connective information attached to uncertain 
language concerns physical morphology (389-390), diet (376-378), and the ability to talk (406). 
The uncertainty about the physical morphology connection between AMHs and Neandertals is 
qualitatively mild: “The skeleton . . . has a number of archaic, Neandertal-like cranial and 
postcranial features” (389-390). The sentence questions the connective quality of the cranial 
features by referring to them as being “Neandertal-like features” as opposed to just “Neandertal 
features.” Although making the audience question exactly how alike those features are, the 
sentence is only mildly uncertain.  
The uncertainty concerning information about the Neandertal diet barely even qualifies 
as uncertainty. The paragraph begins by cautiously clarifying that Neandertal remains being 
found with animal bones can not lead to definite conclusions about the Neandertal diet: 
“Suggestive though this evidence is, the mere presence of animal remains does not reveal how 
important animals were in the people's diet” (376-378). However, this same paragraph goes on 
to instill the audience with more confidence that it really was the case that Neandertals not only 
ate meat as an important part of their diet, but were successful hunters, too: “The chemical 
signature of diet . . . is a powerful indicator of Neandertals' effectiveness in acquiring and 
consuming animal protein. That is, it shows that Neandertals were successful hunters.” (376-
378).  The uncertainty about this particular similarity is diminished within the same paragraph 
in which it is introduced. The order of all this information should also be considered;  
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Table 9. 
Language of Uncertainty Attached to Neandertal Descriptions 
 
because endings of paragraphs have more stress than beginnings, the uncertainty in this 
paragraph is not only undermined in the paragraph’s overall content, but also its structure. 
The information about Neandertals perhaps being able to talk is also mild in its 
uncertainty: “Anthropologists do not know when spoken communication first began, but at 
least one Neandertal had the vocal anatomy consistent with speech” (406). The uncertainty is 
mild here partly because of the order of information, beginning with the uncertainty 
(“anthropologists do not know when spoken communication first began”) and ending with the 
connective information (“but at least one Neandertal had the vocal anatomy consistent with 
speech” [406]). If Larsen had wanted to, he could have introduced further doubt about this idea 
by flipping the order of information in the sentence’s second part, perhaps writing something 
like “The vocal anatomy consistent with speech has only been found in one Neandertal,” thus 
stressing the number “one,” which is not an overwhelming amount of evidence. However, the 
connective information “vocal anatomy consistent with speech” is stressed instead. Thus, the 
doubt, although present, is relatively mild.  
Uncertainty and Disconnection. In comparison to uncertain language attached to 
connective information, the uncertain language attached to disconnective information is much 
more pronounced. The information attached to uncertainty concerns the ability to talk (379), 
Level of Connection 
or Disconnection 
Neandertal 
relation to AMHs 
Number of 
paragraphs 
Quality of uncertainty (in 
number of paragraphs) 
   
Paragraph  Neutral or Both 1 
 
 
Connective 3 
 
 
Disconnective  5 
 
 
Sentence  Neutral or Both 1 
 
 
Connective 3 
 
Mild (3) 
 
Disconnective  5 Pronounced (5) 
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the age of Neandertals (229-230), and gene flow and/or whether or not Neandertals evolved into 
humans (372, 372-373, and 393-394). Concerning Neandertals’ alleged inability to talk, doubt is 
introduced in the beginning of the paragraph by use of the word “belief”: “early anthropologists 
believed that Neandertals lacked the ability to speak” (379). The paragraph also temporally 
distances readers from the belief of disconnection by attaching it to “early anthropologists.” 
The paragraph is not all about “early anthropologists,” however, stating that the idea of 
Neandertals not being able to talk “continues to the present.” Larsen then goes on to describe 
research by Philip Lieberman and Edmund Crelin, who reconstructed a Neandertal vocal tract. 
The reconstruction led the researchers to believe that Neandertals lacked the ability to produce 
sounds for articulate speech, but the paragraph ends by instilling doubt about Lieberman and 
Crelin’s reconstruction: “Although interesting, their reconstruction of the Neandertal vocal tract 
is conjectural. Based on skulls alone, it necessarily lacks the anatomical parts (soft tissues) 
important for speech production” (379).  Thus, this paragraph has a pronounced level of 
uncertainty, especially in comparison to the uncertainty found within the paragraph suggesting 
that Neandertals could talk, which structurally took the stress off the doubt. Structurally, this 
disconnective paragraph does the opposite, stressing the doubt surrounding the disconnection.  
The paragraph containing the uncertainty about the age of Neandertals starts by 
contextualizing research about Neandertal remains that were found in Krapina, Croatia. In 
order to see how old the Krapina remains were, the paleontologist Dragutin Gorjanovic-
Kramberger applied fluorine dating to them and to animals remains found at the same site. If 
Gorjanovic-Kramberger could prove that the animal and Neandertal remains were the same age, 
he could prove that Neandertals were ancient. As a way to contextualize how Gorjanovic-
Kramberger’s results would be received by the people of the time, the disconnective 
information was introduced in the paragraph: “Some scientists believed that the Krapina 
Neandertals were not ancient, however, but had been living at the site in recent times only. They 
considered the Neandertals simply different from people living in Croatia in the late nineteenth 
and early twentieth centuries” (229-230). A shadow of doubt is cast on the view that 
Neandertals were “simply different” with the words “believed” and “considered,” which both 
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highlight the subjectivity of the view.  This view of Neandertals as “simply different” is 
dismissed at the paragraph’s end, which states that “the simple chemical analysis revealed that 
the Neandertal bones and the animal bones had very similar amounts of fluorine” and that “this 
pioneering study had shown human beings' deep roots” (229-230). The uncertainty about 
viewing Neandertals as Other is thus pronounced both in the word choice and in the 
paragraph’s overall context, which ties the idea of Neandertals as Other to an outdated way of 
thinking.   
Also pronounced, through both word choice and context, is the uncertain language 
within the paragraphs that disconnect Neandertals and AMHs through discussion of gene flow 
and/or whether Neandertals evolved into AMHs. The first paragraph in this particular category 
describes the interpretation of a Neandertal skeleton by the eminent paleoanthropologist 
Marcellin Boule. Boule’s views were first contextualized in the paragraph as “tremendously” 
(372) influential during the early 1900s. Overall, Boule viewed Neandertals as Other. The 
paragraph uses more certain language when first describing Boule’s interpretations, stating that 
he “argued” and, toward the end of the paragraph, “concluded.” However, the very end of the 
paragraph leads readers to doubt Boule’s interpretations: “Simply, in [Boule’s] mind, 
Neandertals represented some side branch of human evolution—they were too primitive, too 
stupid, and too aberrant to have evolved into modern humans” (372). Although this paragraph 
ends by stressing the very Otherness that Boule advocated for, it also stresses that the 
particular view of Otherness existed “in the mind,” a quick way to undermine any view.  
The paragraph immediately after the one explaining Boule’s view of Neandertals as 
Other also ends by discussing, and thus stressing, the doubt readers should have about the 
genetic disconnections between AMHs and Neandertals. The paragraph reads:  
Boule's interpretations led to the prevailing view at the time (still held by some 
authorities) that Neandertals were evolutionary dead ends, replaced by the emerging 
modern humans and representing distant cousins of humanity that were not able to 
survive. In rejecting this view, we should take a closer look at some topics Boule 
addressed in his study of the La Chapelle skeleton. (p. 372-373) 
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This paragraph not only leads the audience to question Boule’s views by calling them 
“interpretations,” but also leads the audience in the direction of rejecting Boule’s view 
altogether.  
Like the first two, the third paragraph with uncertain language in relation to genetic 
disconnective information stresses the uncertainty. The paragraph states that the differences in 
mtDNA between Neandertals and AMHs “seem to support the hypothesis that no gene flow 
occurred between Neandertals and modern humans . . . and, importantly, that Neandertals 
contributed none of their genetic material to the modern human gene pool” (393-394). The 
language “seem to” introduces uncertainty, an uncertainty that is further stressed at the 
paragraph’s end by pointing out that mtDNA “reflects only a small fraction of the genetic code” 
(393-394). This weakness in mtDNA research had first been highlighted by Green et al. (2006) 
and Noonan et al. (2006) roughly five years before Larsen’s second edition of the text was 
published, so it would have been expected for Our Origins to be cautious about the differences 
in mtDNA. The paragraph continues, “The failure of one part of the genome to survive to the 
present does not mean that the entire genome became extinct. Moreover, it is possible that 
mtDNA lineages have been lost owing to genetic drift.” (393-394). The very last line in the 
paragraph calls for more research in order to have “a more complete picture” (393-394). Thus, 
the paragraph is not necessarily creating a connection, but simply instilling doubt about 
disconnection.  
 
Analysis of Larsen’s 2014 Our Origins: Changes Between the Second and Third Editions  
 The third edition of Clark Larsen’s Our Origins contains a drastic difference from the 
second edition in framing of content—in the ways Neandertals are dissociated from and 
associated with AMHs—but small changes in the actual paragraphs concerning and language 
used to describe Neandertals. This contrast is a testament both to language’s resistance to 
change and to how language in the second edition was hinting toward the changes in the third 
edition. The most striking change Larsen introduces in the 2014 edition of the book is the 
classification method used. While in the second edition of the text, Larsen stuck to traditional 
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classification because of humans’ “different” and “unique” (176) adaptive trajectory as 
compared to apes, the third edition of the book, citing the “priority of and focus on evolution 
and not description in this book” (Larsen, 2014, p. 173), uses cladistics analysis, which favors 
genetic relationships over physical morphology.  The change in classification systems is 
evidence of a paradigm shift within physical anthropology—the overall classification system in 
the second edition dissociated the two groups, but the third edition uses species classification 
to associate Neandertals and AMHs.  
 The classification shift in the third edition can also be seen in the descriptions of our 
taxonomic family.  Neandertals are called “hominins” (Larsen, 2014, p. 413) in the third edition, 
and “hominin” is defined more broadly. In the second edition, Larsen defines “hominin” as 
“humans and human ancestors in a more recent evolutionary taxonomy based on genetics” 
(176), a definition which is shortened in the third edition as “humans and humanlike ancestors” 
(Larsen, 2014, p. 173). Because of this shift in classification, Larsen’s choice to refer to 
Neandertals as “Homo sapiens,” which was present in multiple places in the text’s second 
edition, was more consistent with the text overall. The contradiction between classification 
system and terms was resolved through a change in classification.  
The smaller, non-structural changes of the text appear in 13 paragraphs about 
Neandertals.6 The changes are in regards to physical morphology, in 7 paragraphs; to behavior, 
in 3 paragraphs; to our African origins, in 2 paragraphs; and to human diversity, in 1 paragraph 
(Table 10).  
 
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 One other paragraph about Neandertals also has a change, but that change is simply to aid 
readers—as opposed to just referring readers to a figure from a previous page, the change 
directs readers to the specific chapter and section of the chapter. This change is therefore not 
relevant for this study.  
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Table 10. 
Changes From Second to Third Edition of Our Origins 
 
Changes in Morphological Descriptions 
In regards to morphology, the most common change to the text was to add an adjective 
to the description of the Neandertal nose. In four paragraphs, in which “wide” was a sufficient 
descriptor for Neandertal noses in the second edition, “tall” was added to “wide” as a descriptor 
of Neandertal noses (366, 374, 375, and 379). The fifth paragraph’s change about noses in the 
third edition adds in an alternate explanation for why Neandertal noses were so large: “the 
large noses of Neandertals may simply be due to the fact that their faces are so large” (Larsen, 
2014, p. 380). The third edition strengthens my assessment above about the second edition that 
noses were used as a way to Other Neandertals and modern humans who have large noses. 
 In addition to adding a descriptor to nose descriptions, the third edition adds 
information to one paragraph that I had discussed above as being vague about the similarities 
between AMH and Neandertal morphology. However, the paragraph in the third edition does 
not make any clearer what the morphological similarities are. The paragraph from the second 
edition reads, “In this reconstruction, the Neandertal looks modern in some respects. 
Neandertals are central to our understanding of modern Homo sapiens' origins” (356). To 
compare, the paragraph from the third edition reads, “In this reconstruction, a Neandertal child 
 
Category Change 
Total Number of 
paragraphs  
 
Number of paragraphs: Type/effect of change 
 
Morphological 
Descriptions  
7 
  
5 paragraphs: strengthen disconnections  
 
1 paragraph:  no change 
 
1 paragraph: lessens disconnections 
 
Behavioral 
Descriptions  
3 2 paragraphs: strengthen connections 
 
1 paragraph: no change 
 
African Origins 2 2 paragraphs: strengthen disconnections 
 
Human Diversity 1 1 paragraph: strengthens connection  
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from Roc-de-Marsal, in Dordogne, France, shows a mix of modern and archaic features. 
Neandertals are central to our understanding of the origins and evolution of modern humans, 
including key aspects of human growth and development” (Larsen, 2014, p. 362). While more 
specific about where this particular Neandertal came from and why understanding Neandertals 
is important in order to understand ourselves, the paragraph is still vague about what the 
similarities are between Neandertal and AMH morphology. However, as compared to the 
language of the second edition (“looks modern in some respects”), the third edition is more 
confident in its statement about morphological similarity, with the Neandertal simply 
“show[ing] a mix of modern and archaic features” (Larsen, 2014, p. 362).  
We also see a move toward accepting Neandertal morphology in one paragraph about 
pathology. In a paragraph about how one Neandertal had a fracture on his face that may have 
caused him to be blind, the third edition clarifies that the fracture was “well healed at the time 
of his death” (Larsen, 2014, pp. 375–376). Thus, the pathological nature of the injury is 
softened in the third edition as compared to the second.  
 
Changes in Behavioral Descriptions 
The third edition of the text also changes its presentation of Neandertal behavior in 
three paragraphs. One paragraph about Neandertal’s symbolic behavior in terms of body 
ornamentation includes more details about how Neandertals made the ornamentation (Larsen, 
2014, p. 388). Another paragraph about the Neandertal diet clarifies that although Neandertals 
ate meat, they did not depend “wholly on animals as sources of food. Analysis of plant residues 
found in Neandertal tooth calculus shows that Neandertals ate a diversity of plants, some of 
which were cooked;” the paragraph goes on to describe how Neandertals may have also self-
medicated with the use of plants, although “we can never know fore sure if they did” (Larsen, 
2014, p. 384). Thus, the behavioral ties between AMHs and Neandertals, already strong in the 
second edition of the book, are further strengthened in the third edition.  
However, there is one area in which the third edition still avoids tying Neandertal 
behavior to AMH behavior—cannibalism. One paragraph offers more details about Neandertal 
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cannibalism, tying the behavior to an additional site not mentioned in the book’s second edition 
(Larsen, 2014, p. 378). Still, the third edition avoids mentioning that AMHs have engaged in 
cannibalism, even though it is true. The reluctance to associate ourselves with this behavior 
held across editions of the textbook.  
 
Strengthening of African Origins and Human Diversity 
In two paragraphs, AMHs’ African origins are strengthened within a context of 
Neandertal description. One paragraph simply clarified that although “symbolic behavior and 
cognitive advancement were present in Europe” (Larsen, 2014, pp. 399–400), they were present 
at an earlier time in Africa. Another paragraph underwent a change in its level of certainty. The 
second edition of the text stated that certain modern characteristics “suggest strongly that 
modern variation originated in Africa” (395). The third edition says that the same topic 
“provides compelling evidence” (Larsen, 2014, p. 402) of an African origin for AMH variation.  
At the same time the text strengthens the African origin of modern humans in its third 
edition, it also allows for more variety in what is considered “human.” The last paragraph to 
differ between the second and third edition of the text not only uses the term “hominin” 
instead of “hominid,” but also adds information that was absent in the second: “The presence 
of a third group—the Denisovans, with a genome distinct from those of Neandertal and modern 
H. sapiens—indicate that diversity in late Pleistocene Europe was complex” (Larsen, 2014, p. 
413). With a third group added to the mix, the “Us versus Them” dichotomy is softened. 
	    54 
RHETORICAL EFFECTS AND POSSIBLE FUTURE DIRECTIONS 
In both the 2011 and 2014 editions of Clark Larsen’s Our Origins, some of the 
descriptions that were applied to Neandertals were outside the author’s control. A lot of the 
terminology of the discipline embeds the notion of human uniqueness and Neandertal 
Otherness—the naming of Homo sapiens neanderthalensis as compared to Homo sapiens 
sapiens, the naming of archaic humans as compared to modern humans, the definition of the 
occipital bun as uniquely tied to Neandertals, etc. Considering the history of how Neandertals 
have been interpreted, the terms that embed views of modern humans as unique are not 
surprising—it is the nature of language to reflect social thought. The nature of language is also 
to resist change—change is always possible, but it generally takes large amounts of time. 
Likewise, science is revolutionary, but it also will resist change unless that change is somehow 
aligned with the current consensus.  
Larsen works within the established paradigms in the text’s second edition by using 
anatomical classification, but even within the second edition, Larsen resists the established 
paradigm of human uniqueness in many ways. Structurally—at the sentence level, at the 
paragraph level, and in the text as a whole—Larsen’s text stresses similarity over difference. It 
also ties similarity to positivity and certainty, and it ties difference with uncertainty. These 
moves, when considered in their cultural and disciplinary contexts, respond to the assumption 
of humans as unique. Essentially, Larsen’s text moves readers to question such an assumption. 
It also implicitly heightens the connection between AMHs and Neandertals by referring to 
Neandertals as Homo sapiens—a move that actually is contradictory in the text’s second edition, 
which uses anatomical classification. The second edition of the text primes its readers to 
implicitly “see that” Neandertals and AMHs are the same species, and this move is made explicit 
in the third edition. The second edition’s contradiction is a hint about the changes to come in 
the text’s third edition.  
From the 2011 to the 2014 edition of Our Origins, Larsen’s text restructured how its 
readers are to “see” Neandertals. The 2014 edition broadly associates Neandertals and AMHs by 
using cladistics classification (based on genetics) instead of the old classification system based 
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on anatomy that the 2011 edition of the text used. The switch in the classification system might 
help physical anthropology to be taken more seriously as a science. As Ruse (1996) notes, 
evolutionary scientists have had trouble gaining respect in the past. Matt Cartmill (2002) 
provides reasoning for this difficulty, critiquing paleoanthropology in particular for being 
content with narrative, a critique which jives with the use of anatomical classification. Cartmill 
believes that paleoanthropologists have been content with simple narrative because the 
narratives crafted within the discipline position humans as unique and special. We can see this 
in the second edition of Larsen’s text, which justifies its use of anatomical classification 
through the assumption that modern humans are adaptively unique (176). Cartmill might 
critique this decision since narratives—like a narrative about how modern humans have unique 
adaptations—are not necessarily explanations; “the only evolutionary events we can explain are 
those that conform to recurring regularities. That’s what ‘explanation’ means” (Cartmill, 2002, 
p. 194). When physical anthropology makes statements about humanity’s uniqueness outside of 
a context of explaining how those unique patterns are the result of the same natural forces 
acting on all organisms, then the discipline has fallen into storytelling. That is not to say that 
storytelling is absent from science, because it is not—but for something to be scientific, it must 
combine storytelling with explanation. Storytelling void of explanation is unscientific.  
The move to use cladistics classification in the 2014 edition is an answer to the type of 
critique made by Cartmill—the third edition of the text justifies its choice in classification by 
appealing to its focus on evolution and “not description” (Larsen, 2014, p. 173). The move to 
cladistics also reflects the broader move—even in other disciplines—to focus on genetic 
classification; National Geographic’s declaration that the term “hominin” would win out over 
“hominid” (Berger, 2001) is supported in this study.  
Possible Future Directions for Physical Anthropology 
In addition to supporting physical anthropology as a science, the switch to cladistics 
supports the notion that Neandertals are more Same than they are Other.  However, there are 
certain ways that both texts present Neandertals as Other—the narrative of human uniqueness, 
although slowly changing, is still present, even within the text’s third edition. In both editions, 
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behavior is broadly used to connect AMHs and Neandertals, but cannibalism is still avoided as a 
site of commonality. The third edition presents more details about evidence for cannibalism 
among Neandertals, so the topic is being broached more than it was in the past. Perhaps if the 
topic continues to be explored, it will eventually be related back to modern human behavior—
even when presented to an introductory audience.  
The third edition stresses morphological differences even more than the second 
edition—and the second edition was already using morphology as a major difference between 
Neandertals and AMHs. To further stress morphological differences appears at odds with the 
third edition’s move to use cladistics—the text moves from anatomical classification to genetic 
classification, and at the same time it heightens its discussion of Neandertal morphology while 
keeping its discussion of Neandertal genetics the same as it is in the second edition. This 
apparent contradiction may foreshadow what is to come in the future—just as the second 
edition of Larsen’s text, by calling Neandertals Homo sapiens even though it uses anatomical 
classification, foreshadows the switch in classification systems in the third edition, the 
contradiction of heightening physical difference at the same time the third edition of the text 
overtly switches to a more connective classification scheme may foreshadow greater diversity 
being accepted into what is considered to be human. That is, contradictions in the texts may 
point readers toward forthcoming paradigmatic change. The switch to greater acceptance of 
human diversity could be something akin to what happened with Neandertal classification in 
the 1970s and early 1980s. At that time, Neandertal classification took on a much more 
connective quality—this was the only time period in which it was common (if not an established 
consensus) to view Neandertals as the same species as us. Also during that time, scholars were 
more often studying the diversity among AMH populations (Condemi, 2011, p. 12). One of the 
few changes introduced in the third edition of the text places Neandertals within a more diverse 
frame by contrasting them with the Denisovans (Larsen, 2014, p. 413), and we may continue to 
see change in the direction of more often viewing Neandertals and AMHs in a broader frame 
with other groups.  
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Without a move to more broadly frame Neandertals and their relation to AMH, the 
Othering of Neandertals through morphological differences will continue to Other certain 
groups of people alive today—like those with wide (and tall) noses. Combating this tendency is 
desirable in order to be sure pre-conceived notions of human uniqueness are not influencing 
scientific views of Neandertals, a critique made by Villa and Roebroeks (2014) in regards to 
archeological evidence.  The very terms of the discipline contain predictable biases to view 
Neandertals as Other, and such deeply ingrained biases influence interpretations of 
Neandertals.  
Combating these deeply ingrained historical biases is possible by more often tying 
Neandertal morphology to positive language. This move is made in both the second and third 
editions of Larsen’s text, but in order to not completely upset commonly accepted paradigms, 
the move is only made within contexts of behaviors and adaptations. The tendency to Other 
Neandertals through morphology can also be combated through language of certainty—a move 
also employed by Larsen.  Additionally, delving more into what the similarities are between 
Neandertal and AMH morphology could combat how Neandertals are defined as Other. Both 
editions of Our Origins were quite vague as to how Neandertal and AMH morphology are 
connected. Perhaps as an intermediate step between being vague about and describing 
morphological similarities, writers within anthropology could focus on how morphology 
reflects behavior, another move employed by Larsen. Blurring the boundaries between 
“behavior” and “morphology” chips away at the paradigm of Neandertals as Other and humans 
as unique, but it also aligns with the current consensus which is much more likely to highlight 
behavioral rather than morphological similarities between Neandertals and AMHs. Blurring 
these boundaries is thus a method to convince others to accept a change.  
 As anthropology continues to move toward genetic classification, the boundary between 
AMHs and Neandertals will have to be interrogated.  Remaining aware of how social 
classifications and paradigms affect our views is crucial in order to present Neandertals in an 
accurate way. Additionally, being aware of the tacit comfort levels that are accepted in regards 
to connecting and associating AMHs and Neandertals can help writers who want to move the 
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consensus toward a view of modern humans as part of nature. Such a shift could be physical 
anthropology’s way to support the Darwinian revolution’s evolution in more implicit ways. 
Although the analysis presented here was based on one text, that text is widely used within 
physical anthropology classrooms. As such, that text is transmitting these attitudes about 
Neandertals to many students. In the future, we should expect to see a continued shift toward 
connecting Neandertals and AMHs, breaking the long-held paradigm of human uniqueness. 
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APPENDIX. INDUCTIVE CODES FROM ANALYZING OUR ORIGINS 
Category Sub-category Terms used in text 
Naming Systems To describe/define 
Neandertals 
Homo sapiens 
Archaic 
Person 
Human 
 
To describe/define AMHs in 
contrast to Neandertals 
Homo sapiens 
Modern 
Person 
Human  
 
Topics Behavior Burial of the dead 
Material culture 
Cannibalism 
Physical Morphology Skull/Cranial 
 
Positive Language Breathtaking 
Fascinating 
Important 
Interesting 
Fundamental 
Best-known, most-studied 
Excellent 
Technique 
Complex 
Considerable/considerably 
Successful/successfully/success 
Effective/effectively 
Fundamentally 
Significant 
Foundation 
 
Generally Certain Language  Language of certainty Evidence 
Demonstrate(s) 
Disproves/proves 
Shows/has shown 
Reveals 
Correct/incorrect 
Distinctive/distinctly 
Insight 
Proves/proving 
Conclude(s) 
 
Language of probability Argues 
Indicates 
Strongly suggests 
Suggests 
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Category (cont.) Sub-category (cont.) Terms used in text (cont.) 
Conjectural Language   Appear to 
Considers 
Possibly 
Conjectural 
In some respects 
Purported 
Potential/potentially 
hypothesize 
 
Generally Uncertain 
Language  
Language of questionable 
claims 
Use of “scare quotes” 
“Noun-like” (although forming a 
connection, adding in the suffix 
“–like” makes it an uncertain 
connection) 
Interpretations 
View 
Although + suggestive 
 
 
Language of doubt “do not know” 
believed 
opinions 
“in his mind” 
 
 
